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Civil Judgment Recognition and
the Integration of Multi-state
Associations: A Comparative
Study
By ROBERT C. CASAD
A.B., M.A., J.D., S.J.D.
Visiting Professor of Law, University of California
Hastings College of the Law, 1980, Professor of Law, University of
Kansas*
The past three decades have seen, on the one hand, new na-
tion-states spawned by the breaking up of colonial empires, and on
the other hand, the integration of separate nation-states into
multi-state associations. Most notable and successful of such as-
sociations is the European Economic Community; but other move-
ments, aimed at greater or lesser degrees of integration have been
formed in Latin America, the Caribbean area, Africa, and the Mid-
dle East.
One feature of any such association likely to achieve signifi-
cant integration is an effective scheme for the mutual recognition
and enforcement of civil judgments. This proposition was clearly
understood by the founders of the United States of America; for
example, both the Articles of Confederation" and the Constitution 2
contained Full Faith and Credit Clauses.
The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic
Community in 1957 contained no express arrangement for judg-
ment recognition among the member states. However, it noted the
* This article is taken from a larger work that was submitted as a dissertation for the
degree of Doctor of Juridical Science at the Harvard Law School. The project received some
financial support from the Organization of American States, and from the University of
Kansas General Research Fund. Such merit as it may have owes much to the guidance and
counsel of Professor Donald T. Trautman, dissertation advisor, and Professor Kurt
Nadelmann, a member of the dissertation committee. Weaknesses in the work, of course, are
the author's own responsibility.
1. ART. OF CONFEDA'TION art. IV.
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
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importance of the problem, and relied on the member states to ne-
gotiate treaties with each other to provide for the "simplification of
the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and execution
of judicial decisions and arbitrational awards."8 It soon became ap-
parent that full realization of the goals of the Community could
not be achieved without the establishment in all the member states
of uniform rules to ensure nearly automatic recognition and en-
forcement of civil and commercial judgments.
Accordingly, in October of 1959 the Commission of the Euro-
pean Economic Community sent a letter to the member states de-
claring that
... a true internal market between the six states will be achieved
only if adequate legal protection can be guaranteed. The eco-
nomic life of the Community will be liable to disturbances and
difficulties unless it is possible, where necessary, by judicial
means to ensure the recognition and enforcement of the individ-
ual rights which will arise from multiple legal relationships. As
the power of the judiciary in both civil and commercial matters is
derived from the sovereignty of Member States, and the effect of
judicial instruments remains limited to national territory, legal
protection, and consequently, legal security in the Common Mar-
ket are essentially dependent on Member States adopting a satis-
factory solution to the problem of recognition and enforcement of
judgments.
4
A negotiating committee was convened in 1960 to prepare a
draft convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters. The draft was completed in 1964,
and after extensive debate, adopted and ratified by the six original
Community members.5 It became effective February, 1973.6 Some
significant modifications of the Convention were made in 1978 to
accomodate the accession of Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain
to the Community.
Another regional integration plan that was formed somewhat
3. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, art. 220, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 87.
4. Report of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, 1972 BuLL. EuR. COMM. (Supp. Dec. 1972), [hereinafter
cited as the Jenard Report].
5. The six original members of the European Economic Community were: Belgium,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
6. See Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: An Analysis of
the Provisions of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 24 INT'L. & CoM. L.Q. 44 (1975).
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later than the European Economic Community was the Central
American Common Market. Central America at present is under-
going some severe political shocks, and the Common Markets has,
for all practical purposes, dissolved. Nonetheless there are lessons
to be learned from the Central American experience that benefit
our understanding of the integration process, especially in the con-
text of lesser developed nations. It is particularly interesting that
Central America was at one time a political federation; its reinte-
gration has since been proclaimed to be a matter of high policy for
each of the member states.7 The Central American Common Mar-
ket was merely the latest in a long series of integration plans.8
The constitution of the short-lived Federal Republic of Cen-
tral America and the later, half-formed, Central American Confed-
eration contained specific provisions for judgment recognition and
enforcement,9 as did several still later regional treaties of peace
7. The present constitutions of four of the five member states of the former Federal
Republic of Central America contain strong declarations of this policy.
El Salvador: EL SALVADOR CONST. of 1962, art. 10:
El Salvador, being a part of the Central American Nation, is obligated to pro-
mote the total or partial reconstruction of the Republic of Central America. The
Executive Power, with the approval of the Legislative, will be capable of accom-
plishing that in a confederate, federal or unitary form, without the necessity of
authorization or ratification by a Constituent Assembly [Constitutional Conven-
tion], so long as republican and democratic principles are respected in the new
State, and the essential rights of individuals and associations are fully guaranteed.
Guatemala: GUATEMALA CONST. of 1965, art. 2:
Guatemala, as part of the Central American community, will maintain and
cultivate fraternal relations of cooperation and solidarity with the other States
that fomed the Federation, and, faithful to the patriots' ideal that inspired it, will
take all just and peaceful measures that will conduce to the total or partial realiza-
tion of the union of Central America.
Honduras: HONDURAS CONST. of 1965, art. 9:
Honduras is a separated State of the Republic of Central America. Conse-
quently, it recognizes as a primoridal necessity the return to a union with one or
more States of the former Federation. To this end, the Legislative Power is em-
powered to ratify treaties tending to bring that about, partially or totally, so long
as they are proposed in a just and democratic manner.
Nicaragua: NICARAGUA CONST. of 1950, art. 6:
Sovereignty and territory are indivisible and inalienable. Nevertheless, trea-
ties can be celebrated that tend to bring about a union with one or several repub-
lics of Central America....
8. See generally, KARNs, THE FAILURE OF UNION: CENrRAL AMERICA 1824-1960 (1961);
M. GAVIDIA, ANOTACIONES DE HisTORA PATRLA CENTRO AMERICANA (1953). 0. COLINDRES, LA
INTEGRACI6N POLTICA DE CENTROAMERICA (1975).
9. CONST. of 1824, art. 193: "The legal and juridical acts of one State will be recognized
in all the others." 0. COLINDRES, supra note 8, at 389.
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and amity.10 The basic Charter of the Central American Common
Market, however, contained no reference to the matter. Perhaps,
one reason for this omission was that all the member states - as
well as Panama, which was officially invited to join the union
(when and if it saw fit) - were already signatories to an instru-
ment that embodied a scheme of judgment recognition. That in-
strument is the Pan American Code of Private International Law,""
more commonly referred to as the Bustamante Code in honor of its
principal architect. 2
The Bustamante Code was promulgated as the Final Act of
10. Treaty of Friendship, Peace and Trade, 1887, art. 16, declared:
Article 16. Judgments in civil and commercial matters arising from duly legalized
personal actions and rendered by the courts of one of the parties shall have, at the
request of those courts, in the territory of the other parties, equal force as those
rendered by the local courts and shall be executed in the same way as them.
So that these judgments may be executed, they must previously be declared
final by the pertinent Higher Court of the Republic in which the execution will
take place; and this court will not declare them to be such unless it has first ascer-
tained in summary proceedings:
1. That the judgment has been rendered by a competent judicial authority
and that the parties were legally summoned.
2. That the parties have been legally represented or declared legally in
default.
3. That the judgment does not contain provisions contrary to the public
order or the public law of the State.
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICA COMMITrEE, WORK Ac-
COMPLISHED By THE INTER-AMERIcAN JURIDICAL COMMrrEE DURING ITS REGULAR MEETING
HELD FROM JULY 26 TO AUGUST 27, 1973, p. 113, n.2 CJI-17, OEA/SER. Q/IV.7 (April 1974).
Article 15 of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1907 declared as follows:
The judicial authorities of the contracting Republics shall carry out the judi-
cial commissions and warrants in civil, commercial or criminal matters, with re-
gard to citations, interrogatories and other acts of procedure or judicial function.
Other judicial acts, in civil or commercial matters, arising out of a personal
suit, shall have in the territory of any one of the contracting Parties equal force
with those of the local tribunals and shall be executed in the same manner, pro-
vided always that they shall first have been declared executory by the Supreme
Tribunal of the Republic wherein they are to be executed, which shall be done if
they meet the essential requirements of their respective legislation and they shall
be carried out in accordance with the laws enacted in each country for the execu-
tion of judgments.
2 W. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND OTHER AGREE-
MENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS, 1776-1909, at 2395-96
(1910). This provision was reaffirmed in treaties of 1923 and 1934.
11. Drafters of the Cede included representatives from North America, Mexico, South
America and Central America.
12. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante y Sirven, a Cuban jurist and scholar, was formerly
a magistrate of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
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the Sixth International Conference of American States, November
25, 1928, in Havana. It codified principles of choice-of-law, juris-
diction and judgment recognition. s The Code aimed at hemi-
spheric acceptance by expressly providing that signatory nations
were free to apply as "personal" law either that of the domicile or
that of nationality. 14 Nations were also free to adopt the Code with
reservations. 5 Uniformity thus could not be achieved under the
Bustamante Code unless all nations voluntarily chose either
domicile or nationality as the basis for "personal" law and ac-
cepted the Code without reservation. This did not occur. Even
with these concessions to local concerns, not all nations were will-
ing to sign. 6 All the nations of the Central American isthmus ulti-
mately did ratify the Bustamante Code, although some of them ex-
pressed reservations."
In spite of its inadequacies as a vehicle for hemispheric unifi-
cation of private international law,"8 the Bustamante Code pro-
vided the framework for a general plan of judgment recognition
within Central America. It contained principles of jurisdiction, 9
general rules relating to res judicata2 0 and enforcement of judg-
ments rendered in other "contracting states", as well as special
rules relating to bankruptcy.
2'
13. See Lorenzen, The Pan American Code of Private International Law 4 TUL. L.
lEv. 499 (1930).
14. Bustamante Code, art. 7.
15. Id. art. 3.
16. Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and the United States refused to
sign. See Lorenzen, supra note 13, at 501.
17. Nicaragua reserved the right to depart from the Code in any situation in which its
provisions conflicted with Nicaraguan law or with Canon law as recognized in Nicaragua.
See 4 M. HUDSON, INTsRNATIONAL LEGLSLATION 2352 (1931). Nicaragua did not say it would
apply its own rules, but it reserved the right to decide whether to do so or not when neces-
sity should arise. Costa Rica joined Colombia in expressly reserving all matters in which the
Code conflicted with local law. Id. El Salvador expressly reserved all matters in which the
Code conflicted with local law, Id. at 2348, including, among other things, the right not to
recognize foreign judgments in inheritance and bankruptcy matters insofar as concerned
Salvadoran immovable property, Id. at 2350-51, rejecting Articles 327, 328 and 329 of the
Code, which appeared to make the court of the domicile of the decedent or debtor compe-
tent in such cases.
18. The Organization of American States Inter-American Council of Jurists has, for
over 20 years, been debating from time to time a resolution seeking to harmonize the Busta-
mante Code with the Montevideo Treaties of 1940 (on Commercial Navigation Law, Proce-
dural Law, Penal Law, and Civil Law), and with the American RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONFLIcT OF LAws.
19. Bustamante Code, arts. 314-343, 382-387.
20. Id. art. 396.
21. Id. arts. 414-422.
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This study examines the role of a scheme of civil judgment
recognition in the integration of multi-state associations and will
analyze comparatively the effectiveness of three particular systems
in fulfilling that role.
I. JUDGMENT RECOGNITION IN THE
INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE STATE
ENTITIES.
A. Interests Affected by the Recognition Decision.
Whether one nation should ever give effect to the judgments
of other nations depends on whether that nation's interests are
served or disserved thereby. If its interests are significantly dis-
served, recognition of a foreign judgment is unlikely. Normally a
nation will not sacrifice significant local interests merely to give
effect within its borders to a sovereign act of another. However, in
the recognition of judgments simply resolving disputes between
private parties, the interests of the recognizing state may be weak
and indirect. States may differ on the procedure for resolving pri-
vate disputes or on how the substantive merits of a particular situ-
ation should be decided. Nevertheless, the laws provided by differ-
ent states to regulate such matters often reflect merely
administrative or convenience concerns, not important national in-
terests. Even when a citizen of the country may have been a
party-or both parties-to foreign litigation, and even if a differ-
ent result might have been reached if it had been adjudicated in
that country's courts, it does not follow that any significant inter-
ests of that country could be disserved by giving the foreign judg-
ment effect. Every nation has an interest in seeing to it that justice
is done between competing litigants but that does not mean that
every nation has an interest in trying in its own courts the merits
of a case that has been adjudicated elsewhere. Every nation also
has an interest in economy of its judicial resources, an interest that
should normally preclude the reconsideration of matters once
fairly adjudicated anywhere. Clearly, relitigation should be pre-
cluded if there is no reason to believe that a different or better
outcome would result if the matter were tried again. Even in cases
where a different outcome might be likely, other concerns may
nevertheless require that recognition and effect be given to the for-
eign judgment.
Trautman and von Mebren have indentified five concerns that
[Vol. 4
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are shared to some degree by all civilized states and which point
toward the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments:22
(1) a desire to avoid the duplication of effort and consequent
waste involved in reconsidering a matter that has already been
litigated;
(2) a related concern to protect the successful litigant, whether
plaintiff or defendant, from harassing or evasive tactics on the
part of his previously unsuccessful opponent;
(3) a policy against making the availability of local enforcement
the decisive element, as a practical matter, in the plaintiff's
choice of forum;
(4) an interest in fostering stability and unity in an interna-
tional order in which many aspects of life are not confined to any
single jurisdiction; and,
(5) in certain classes of cases, a belief that the rendering juris-
diction is a more appropriate forum than the recognizing jurisdic-
tion, either because the former was more convenient or because as
the predominantly concerned jurisdiction or for some other rea-
son its views as to the merits should prevail.
The relative strength of these interests can vary from country
to country, and from case to case, as can, of course, the nature and
strength of local countervailing interests that might be impaired by
giving effect to the unrevised foreign judgment without revision.
Local interests of the recognizing state that may oppose recog-
nition of a foreign judgment include the interest in having its own
substantive law principles applied to the case (or, at least, in hav-
ing the principles applied which its choice of law rules would iden-
tify) and the interest in seeing to it that minimal standards of pro-
cedural fairness were observed in any judgment that is to be given
effect within its territory. Moreover, a state may have a strong in-
terest in seeing to it that its substantive rules or choice of law prin-
ciples govern the merits of the case if one of the parties is a citizen
or domiciliary of the state, or if events giving rise to the litigation
had some significant impact in that state.
B. Association Interests.
Besides the relative strengths of these policies and concerns,
the political relationship between the jurisdiction where the judg-
22. von Mebren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a
Suggested Approach, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1601, 1603-04 (1968).
No. 11
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ment was rendered and the one where it is sought to be enforced is
also relevant. That relationship is an element of the enforcing
state's own interests, but it is important enough to merit special
attention.
When the two states are linked together in some sort of multi-
ple-state association, the interests numbered 2, 3, and 4 in the von
Mehren-Trautman model, supra, take on special relevance. These
concerns are present to some degree in any case where recognition
is sought in one state for judgments rendered in another, but their
importance is magnified when the states are member states of a
larger association formed to promote mutual political or economic
goals. Local concerns that might otherwise justify denying recogni-
tion to a judgment may be outweighed by association interests.
The association interests are shared by all of the member states,
but in particular cases the special interests of individual states
may conflict with the association interests. Thus, a sound scheme
of judgment recognition should rest on an analysis that can iden-
tify and evaluate the association interests potentially affected by a
decision granting or refusing to grant recognition to a judgment of
a sister state.
The nature and strength of the association interests affected
by such a decision depends upon the character and purposes of the
association. The interests of a loose regional association like the
Organization of American States are neither so extensive nor so
intensive as those of a federal union such as the United States of
America. Somewhere in between the federal union and the O.A.S.
on a spectrum of associational strength lie sub-regional organiza-
tions like the Organization of Central American States, and re-
gional common market organizations, such as the European Eco-
nomic Community and the Central American Common Market.
Several association interests can be identified that are af-
fected by a member state's rules relating to the recognition and
enforcement of judgments rendered by other member states of the
association. Probably most important is the interest in faithful and
consistent application and interpretation of the provisions and pol-
icies of the association's basic charter and its implementing regula-
tions. This interest must be accorded great weight. Toward that
end, multiple-state associations sometimes create special tribunals
to review the decisions of constituent states involving such ques-
tions of interpretation. The Supreme Court of the United States is
such a tribunal. In the European Economic Community this func-
[Vol. 4
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tion is performed by the European Court of Justice; although that
tribunal's jurisdiction is not broad enough to cover all situations in
which the community's interests are affected by local tribunals.2 3
At one time there existed the Central American Court of Justice,
an international tribunal comparable to the European Court of
Justice. Established in 1907, the Central American Court of Justice
was the world's first judicial institution with the power to adjudi-
cate-not just arbitrate or mediate-disputes between nations. All
five Central American nations solemnly bound themselves to sub-
mit to its jurisdiction and abide by its judgments. Five judges, one
from each country, sat on the Court. It was to have a life of ten
years, after which time its continued existence was to depend upon
how successful its work had been. It was designed to represent the
"National Conscience of Central America."
The Court's jurisdiction was as follows:
(a) all controversies or questions which might arise among [the
Central American Nations] of whatsoever nature and no matter
what their origin might be, in case their respective Departments
of Foreign Affairs had not been able to reach an understanding;
(b) the questions which individuals of one Central American
Country might raise against any of the other contracting govern-
ments, because of the violation of treaties or conventions, and
other cases of international character, no matter whether their
own government supported their claim or not, provided, however,
that the remedies which the laws of the respective country af-
forded for such a violation had been exhausted or that a denial of
justice had been shown;
(c) cases between two or more governments or between one gov-
ernment and one individual, when submitted by a common ac-
cord; and
(d) international questions which any of the five governments
and a foreign government might submit to it by a special
agreement.2 '
The Court considered only ten cases during its ten year existence.25
23. See MANN, THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRA-
TION, 48-89 (1972) and A. GREEN, POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY JURISPRUDENCE, 57 passim.
(1970).
24. A. BUSTAmANTE, THE WORLD COURT 68 (1925).
25. The last of these cases, and the one that spelled the end of the Court, involved the
validity of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in which Nicaragua granted the United States the
right to build a canal through Nicaragua, the right to build a naval base on the Gulf of
Fonseca, Nicaragua, and renew all leases for two Caribbean islands, the Corn Islands. Costa
No. 1]
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The General Treaty of the Central American Common Market
provided for an Arbitration Tribunal to resolve disputes relating to
the interpretations of provisions of the treaty that could not be
otherwise resolved, but it has had almost no use.2" Likewise, the
Charter of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA)
provided for a Central American Court of Justice, but this tribu-
nal, too, has been essentially non-functional.27 The absence of an
effective unifying tribunal makes it all the more important that the
association's interest in faithful and consistent interpretation and
application of the association's basic policies be accorded weighty
consideration in decisions relating to recognition of sister state
judgments. The association interest in uniformity and consistency
would normally require one state to give conclusive effect to a
judgment of another embodying such an interpretation, unless: 1)
it was clearly wrong; 2) previous decisions of the enforcing state or
other association states had given the same point an interpretation
different from the one embodied in the judgment; 3) some truly
fundamental municipal interest of the enforcing state would be im-
paired by according the decision conclusive effect; or 4) some other
important association interest (besides the interest in faithful and
consistent interpretation of basic policy) would be impaired
thereby. If the judicial decisions containing such interpretations
are duly publicized and circulated among courts in the member
states, inconsistent rulings should occur only rarely.2" Incorrect
Rica claimed the treaty violated longstanding agreements between it and Nicaragua grant-
ing Costa Rica free navigational rights in the San Juan River and the right of consultation
on any canal plans. El Salvador and Honduras which also coast upon the Gulf of Fonseca,
claimed that none of the countries could cede control of any of the shore without the con-
sent of the others. The Court entertained the case (although disclaiming any jurisdiction
over the United States) and ruled that Nicaragua had violated earlier treaties with the
plaintiff countries. When neither Nicaragua nor the United States would heed the decision,
it became clear that another helpful step toward reunification had failed. Central American
historians are proud of the Court and its accomplishments, and many have speculated that
it could have been the key to solid reunification if the United States had accepted its judg-
ment. The United States did not, however, and the Court's term was not renewed when it
expired. See KARNES, supra note 8, at 200-01.
26. Barbante, Estructura Institucional del Mercado Comun Centroamericano, 42 LEC-
ClONE s Y ENSAYOS 133, 154 (1970) (U. Nac. de Buenos Aires).
27. See Soto, Sobre la Justicia en la Integraci6n Regional, 20-21 REvISTA DE CIENCIAS
JURIDICAs 285 (1972) (U. of Costa Rica). (The cited work contains a draft of a plan for the
creation of a fully functional "Central American Superior Court" at 302-05.)
28. Unfortunately in the Central American region judicial decisions are not regularly
published and are not circulated widely even in the country where rendered, much less
throughout the region. The role of courts in refining and clarifying association policy, thus,
has been severely limited.
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and inconsistent interpretations thus publicized can be remedied
legislatively by amending the basic documents of the association to
reflect the desired meaning. Recognition without revision of the in-
terpretation is the best judicial response to a sister state judgment
interpreting the basic policy, even if the enforcing court disagrees
with the interpretation.
Related to the association interest in consistent interpretation
of the basic charter and policies is the interest in the avoidance of
conflict between local law and association policies. Presumably
member states are conscious of this interest when promulgating
legislative enactments or regulations after the adoption of the basic
charter. Nonetheless, potential conflicts between the basic char-
ter's policies and the pre-existing corpus juris of the member
states, are likely to go undetected until the issue is confronted in
an actual controversy. It is normally in the association's interest
for such controversies to be resolved by according primacy to the
association policy over the local one unless the local policy is of
such fundamental importance to the concerned member state that
its further participation in the association would be jeopardized if
its local policy had to yield. This interest is relevant to the'judg-
ment recognition decision even if no question of interpretation or
application of the basic charter or policies of the association itself
is directly involved. If the sister state judgment embodies an appli-
cation or interpretation of local law in a way potentially conflicting
with association policy, the association interest is served by keep-
ing the effects of that local law confined to the rendering state.
The denial of extraterritorial recognition in such a case serves to
dramatize the potential conflict and bring it to the attention of
both the lawmakers of the rendering state and of the association
for appropriate consideration. The enforcing state in such a case
should weigh this interest against other interests tending to sup-
port extraterritorial recognition and enforcement of the judgment.
Unless the conflict between the local rule and association policy is
substantial and direct, it is doubtful that this interest alone would
be sufficient to offset other concerns that normally favor recogni-
tion. When such a conflict is suggested, however, the enforcing
state may have to look behind the face of the judgment.
Another association interest meriting consideration is the in-
terest in the mobility of goods and persons among the member
states. This may be one of the basic policies of the association, and
so this interest could be subsumed in the broader ones previously
No. 1]
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discussed. But since the international movement of goods and per-
sons makes international recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments a significant problem, this interest merits special attention.
Significant to the goals of a common market, the association
interest in mobility of goods and persons argues for a general, asso-
ciation-wide policy of recognition and enforcement of judgments
without revision of the merits. Mobility is important to such an
association in that it facilitates responsiveness to opportunities for
economic development within the region. Labor and capital, goods,
and services should be encouraged to flow from one place to an-
other within the region in response to economic considerations. Re-
alization of an integrated economy requires that artificial barriers
and non-economic concerns tending to inhibit the free flow be
eliminated to the greatest possible extent. If havens from the
claims of judgment creditors are eliminated from the region, then
one potentially inhibiting consideration would be removed. The as-
sociation interest in mobility of goods and persons argues for a
rule, uniform throughout the region, guaranteeing a virtually auto-
matic recognition and enforcement of the judgments of each mem-
ber state in all others.
Another association interest deserving mention is the interest
in fostering a climate of confidence and faith in the security of
commercial transactions. Ready enforceability and recognition of
judgments throughout the region is obviously a factor conducive to
such a climate.
C. Conditions Generally Requisite to Judgment Recognition.
A sound judgment recognition regime should produce results
that reflect a rational balance of the interests favoring and those
opposing'recognition. Most existing regimes, however, do not call
for a conscious weighing of the competing interests. Instead, they
base the decision to extend recognition on the presence or absence
of certain specific conditions, some but not all of which bear a rela-
tion to relevant policy principles.
1) Jurisdiction and Competence.
One condition regarded as essential in all judgment recogni-
tion systems is jurisdiction; e.g., the rendering court must have had
jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. Anglo-American law analyzes
separately jurisdiction over parties and over subject matter. The
[Vol. 4
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legal systems of Continental Europe and Latin America employ
the concept of "competency," which is similar, but not identical, to
our notions of jurisdiction. The standards of jurisdiction for this
purpose are not necessarily the same as those that either the ren-
dering state or the recognizing state would apply to determine
whether one of its courts could entertain the case. A distinction is
generally made, in other words, between jurisdiction or compe-
tency in the domestic sense, i.e. the conditions that must exist
before a court can entertain an original action, and in the "interna-
tional" sense. Jurisdiction in the international sense depends upon
the factors tending to connect the case and the defendant to the
rendering state in a way that satisfies the recognizing state's con-
ception of what is fair in "the handling of the litigation involving
significant foreign elements."29 The bases for personal jurisdiction
in Anglo-American law are factors tending to connect the defend-
ing party to the forum state.30 "Competence" standards in other
29. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1610.
30. Traditionally, the authorized bases were said to be physical presence, consent, and
domicile. Under the traditional tests, defendant could be constitutionally subjected to suit
in a state only if he was domiciled there, was personally served with process while physically
present there, or if he consented to suit there. See RESTATEmENT, Judgments § 14, Comment
1 at 19. This traditional approach was seriously deficient for a federal system such as the
United States, however. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and
the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHi. L. REv. 569, 577 (1958). Eventu-
ally the Supreme Court, in the famous case of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), rejected the notion that personal service on a non-consenting non-
resident defendant while physically present in the state was necessary for due process. All
that is necessary in such a case (insofar as concerns the basis element of jurisdiction) is
"certain minimun contracts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. at 316.
The application of this very flexible test involves a weighing of the factors favoring the
exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant for that case and the factors opposing such an
exercise. It involves a consideration of "the quality and nature of the [defendant's] activity
in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the
due process clause to insure." Id. at 319. Such questions as the expectations of the parties,
regulatory concerns of the various states with which the case has an arguable connection,
relative procedural convenience, etc., are relevant in determining whether sufficient contact
exists between the parties and issues and the forum state to satisfy due process. A single
liability creating act or event within the state may be enough contact to satisfy the standard
for an action arising out of that act, if the act or event was the result of the defendant's own
conduct undertaken with awareness of its potential impact in that state. See Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). A more substantial connection is required, however, to justify
jurisdiction for a cause of action unrelated to the defendant's activity in the forum state.
See Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
In 1945, then, physical presence in the state of a non-consenting non-resident ceased to
be a necessary condition for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a state court. It contin-
ued to be widely assumed, however, that physical presence was a sufficient condition until
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systems also commonly require some enduring connection between
the subject of the action and the forum state."1
2) Notice.
"Jurisdiction" as used in Anglo-American courts also includes
such matters as the form, content and timing of the notice given
the defendant. In other systems the notice element is considered
separately from "competency." A foreign judgment will not be ac-
corded recognition unless it satisfies the "international" standards
not only as to the bases for jurisdiction (or competency), but also
as to notice.
3) Choice of Law and Public Policy.
Some countries also apply a "choice of law" test to determine
whether a foreign judgment is entitled to recognition.32 In such
countries a foreign judgment will be recognized without reexamina-
tion of the substantive merits only if the rendering court applied
legal principles consistent with those that the recognizing court
would apply. Although this test is not an established requirement
in Anglo-American law, it does help to identify cases in which the
local interests of the recognizing court may warrant denial of
recognition.
Such a test, like the jurisdictional test, tends to ensure that
the defendant has been treated with at least minimal fairness by
a jurisdiction which is not unduly parochial in its view of interna-
tional transactions. Furthermore, when the requested jurisdiction
has a legitimate interest in the parties or in the factual situation
out of which the controversy arose, failure to apply the law which
its courts would apply suggests that its interests may not have
been properly protected. However, when choice-of-law practices
are generally reasonable, these arguments are not conclusive, and
they may yield to considerations of convenience and simplicity.33
1977. In that year, the Supreme Court in the case of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 86 de-
clared that "all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." Id. at 2584-85. The full signifi-
cance of this decision is not yet clear, but it may mean that physical presence of a non-
consenting non-resident is no longer sufficient for due process. See Casad, Shaffer v. Heit-
ner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory? 26 KAN. L. REv. 61, 73 (1977).
31. See, e.g., the discussion of the French rules of competence in HERZOG, CIVM PROCE-
DURE IN FRANCE 170 passim (1967).
32. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1636.
33. Id. at 1637.
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Some states that do not employ a choice-of-law test neverthe-
less give effect to local substantive policy concerns, as well as basic
notions of procedural fairness, through a vague "public policy"
doctrine. Even American courts may resort to this doctrine to
avoid recognition of some judgments rendered in foreign coun-
tries. 34 The "public policy" concept is difficult to define, and its
application may be an unpredictable factor in the judgment recog-
nition scheme.
4) Reciprocity.
In some states foreign judgment recognition turns on whether
or not the state in which the judgment was rendered would grant
recognition to a judgment of the enforcing state under reciprocal
circumstances. Presumably the justification for the state's adopting
the reciprocity test is the pressure that may exert on the other
country to force it to grant recognition without revision to that
state's judgments. Since the foreign country's interests normally
are not involved directly in the denial of recognition to a private
judgment, this is a rather ineffective form of pressure. Moreover, it
is the once successful private litigant who must bear the burden of
this means of exerting pressure on the other country. The reciproc-
ity rule has been recognized in the United States in a limited
way,35 but it is generally assumed not to be constitutionally re-
quired: some states have refused to follow it at all." Nonetheless
the reciprocity rule is still widely followed in Latin America.
5) Finality.
A common requirement is that the judgment for which recog-
nition is sought must have achieved some degree of finality. Proce-
dures for international judicial assistance, however, often can be
employed to give extraterritorial effect to some kinds of interlocu-
tory orders, such as serving process, taking testimony, and even
issuing provisional attachments of property.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 117, Comment c (1971).
35. See Hilton v. Guyot, supra note H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 392-
93 (4th ed. 1964).
36. See, e.g., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E.
121 (1926).
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II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS IN A TYPICAL ACTION FOR
MONEY
One way to gauge the effectiveness of a multi-state judgment
recognition system in promoting the association interests is to ex-
amine its operation in a typical case and to compare it to the oper-
ation of other multi-state systems in the same kind of case. For
this comparison, we will use the case of a judgment rendered in an
ordinary action for money based on a liquidated claim. We will
examine the conditions that must be satisfied for the judgment to
be entitled to recognition and enforcement in the other associated
states under the regimes of the United States, the European Eco-
nomic Community, and the Bustamante Code. From this compari-
son we will be able to see the relative effectiveness of the three
systems in striking an appropriate balance of the individual, local
state, and association interests affected by the judgment-recogni-
tion decision.
A. Basic Enforcement Procedure.
The procedural steps that must be taken in order to entitle a
sister state judgment to enforcement differ considerably among the
three systems under comparison here.
In the United States the normal method of enforcing money
judgments entails the bringing of an action in an ordinary court of
first instance in the enforcing state to collect the debt declared by
the judgment to be owing. This procedure has been held consistent
with the Full Faith and Credit Clause.37 The party seeking enforce-
ment can prove the cause of action by presenting a copy of the
judgment, duly authenticated as prescribed by federal law.38 The
Full Faith and Credit Clause thus makes a money judgment en-
forceable without re-examination of the merits of the underlying
claim wherever the judgment debtor may have property. If there is
no defect of jurisdiction or other invalidity that would warrant de-
nial of full faith and credit, a judgment is granted by the enforcing
court which can then be enforced by the same procedures as are
available for domestic judgments.
37. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1733.
[Vol. 4
Civil Judgment
The conventional procedure is a contentious one. Jurisdiction
of the enforcing state over the defendant or his property must be
obtained through the service of process, affording the defendant an
opportunity to appear in opposition to the judgment, before a new
judgment can be rendered in the enforcing state authorizing execu-
tion there. Although contentious, the procedure is normally un-
complicated. The only issues that can be raised to avoid enforce-
ment are those relating to jurisdiction, broadly defined, of either
the rendering or the enforcing court. No inquiry into the merits of
the claim underlying the judgment is permissible. Not even the
strong "public policy" of the enforcing state will provide a defense
to enforcement.39 The federal policy of interstate enforcement of
ordinary civil judgments always prevails over the local substantive
policy of the enforcing state. Not even the existence of a prior in-
consistent judgment in the enforcing state,' or the pendency there
of an action on the claim embodied in the judgment, provides a
defense to enforcement in the American regime of full faith and
credit. Enforcement of the judgment is the only proper way for a
plaintiff to seek recovery in another state on an obligation that has
been reduced to a money judgment. His or her original claim is
said to "merge" in the judgment, and he or she cannot sue again
on the original claim 41 if the opposing party brings the existence of
the judgment to the attention of the court in the later action.
Appeal of the judgment granting or denying enforcement to a
sister-state judgment is possible under the same conditions as ap-
peals of other judgments. Since a federal constitutional question is
involved, review may ultimately be sought in the Supreme Court of
the United States to determine whether full faith and credit was
properly accorded or withheld.
An even more expeditious method is provided for the enforce-
ment of a judgment of one U.S. District Court in other District
Courts.42 This procedure eliminates the need for initiating a sepa-
39. Fauntleroy v. Lur, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
40. Trienes v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). See generally Ginsburg, Judg-
ments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judg-
ments, 82 HARv. L. REv. 798 (1969).
41. See R. CASAD, RES JUDICATA IN A NUTSHELL 294 (1976). In this respect the American
scheme treats judgments of sister states differently than it does judgments of foreign na-
tions. It is generally said that the original claim does not "merge" in a foreign country judg-
ment. See Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33
MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1139 (1935).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1963.
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rate action. The judgment, properly authenticated, is registered
with the clerk of the recognizing court, and the judgment thus be-
comes enforceable there.
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, adopted
in several states, 3 also permits enforcement of sister state judg-
ments by registration as an alternative to the conventional method.
The basic enforcement scheme of the European Economic Commu-
nity is different in several respects. The European Economic Com-
munity Convention identifies the court empowered to entertain en-
forcement proceedings in each of the six original member states.
Except in Italy, the court is the general court of first instance.
4
The procedure for enforcement is mainly governed by the local law
of the enforcement state, as is the case in the United States, but
the convention specifies that it is to be a non-contentious proceed-
ing in which the defendant is not entitled to participate. 4 As such,
the defendant is not entitled to notice nor an opportunity to de-
fend in that state. The European procedure thus differs signifi-
cantly from that of the United States and of the Bustamante Code,
discussed infra. The purpose of proceeding without the defendant
is to give the plaintiff a chance to prove his or her foreign judg-
ment before the defendant learns about it, so as to thwart any
move by the defendant to remove property from the jurisdiction4
Protection of the plaintiff creditor is the object. American notions
of procedural fairness proceed from the opposite pole. While an
American creditor can, sometimes, get an order preventing the de-
fendant from moving property beyond the range of the court's pro-
cess while the action is proceeding, the defendant is normally enti-
tled to notice and an opportunity to present countervailing
contentions. 47 American procedural due process stresses the defen-
dant's right to a hearing before any official action is taken that
might adversely affect his or her rights in any way.
The European enforcement court examines the record of the
judgment to see if any of the conditions authorizing non-recogni-
43. UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 9(c).
44. CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1968, ON ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS art. 32 [here-
inafter cited as Convention]. In the United Kingdom, enforcement of maintenance judg-
ments is sought in a subordinate court.
45. Id. art. 34.
46. Jenard Report supra note 4, at 86.
47. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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tion are apparent.48 Non-recognition to a money judgment is au-
thorized only if:
1. It contravenes the public policy of the enforcing state;
2. the defendant lacked adequate notice and an opportunity to
defend in the rendering state;
3. a prior inconsistent judgment had been rendered between the
same parties in the enforcement state or in a non-contracting
state, if it involved the same cause of action and is entitled to
recognition in the enforcing state;
4. the convention's provisions relating to competence were not
satisfied by the rendering court.49
In reviewing this last condition, however, the enforcing court can-
not look beyond the face of the record, as an American court can
do.50 The rendering court is required to pass upon the competence
questions, whether disputed by the parties or not, and it will only
be where there is a failure to comply with that requirement that
lack of competence or "exorbitant" jurisdiction will provide
grounds for non-recognition.
The European proceeding can become a contentious one. The
defendant can appeal from an order granting recognition and the
plaintiff can appeal from an order denying the same. The defen-
dant's appeal is taken to the same court which granted the en-
forcement order in Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom, but to a higher court in Denmark, France,
Germany and Luxembourg.51 A plaintiff's appeal from an order de-
nying enforcement is taken to a higher court in all the countries
except Italy, Ireland and the United Kingdom.52 The appeal does
not entail a second examination of the facts, but merely a consider-
ation of errors of law, and is limited to the same questions that the
enforcement court examined in the first instance. Appeal of the
second judgment is possible in some circumstances.5" If a question
of interpretation of the basic charter is raised, the question may be
referred to the European Court of Justice for an authoritative
ruling.
54
48. Convention, supra note 44, at art. 28.
49. Convention, supra note 44, at art. 28.
50. See Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
51. Convention, supra note 44, at art. 37.
52. Convention, supra note 44 at art. 40.
53. Convention, supra note 44, at arts. 37, 41.
54. E.E.C. Treaty, art. 177.
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As in the United States scheme, the European judgment en-
forcement procedure is the only mechanism through which a plain-
tiff can properly recover in another member state on a claim that
has been reduced to a judgment. Suit on the original claim is
barred.
55
Under the Bustamante Code, basic enforcement procedure is
usually left up to the local law of the enforcing state for the most
part.56 The Central American enforcement scheme, in all countries
except Guatemala, involves a contentious proceeding in the highest
court in the land before a judgment, even of a sister republic of
Central America, can be presented to a court of first instance for
enforcement. 57 Moreover, the Code declares that the state itself is
to be given the opportunity to participate in the proceeding.
5
Since the Bustamante Code generally leaves the enforcement pro-
cedure up to the individual countries the state's participation is
not required, except in Honduras and Panama.5"
Issues that may be litigated in the enforcement proceeding in-
clude competence of the rendering court, adequacy of the notice
given the defendant in the rendering court, executoriness of the*
judgment in the rendering state, and conformity of the judgment
to public policy of the enforcement state.6 0 The existence of a prior
inconsistent judgment in the rendering state is not an express limi-
tation on enforceability (as it is in the E.E.C. Convention), but in
fact such a limitation is observed through the application of the
public policy exception.61
As in the United States, the rendering court must be compe-
tent under both its own and "international" standards. The inter-
national standards to be used for this purpose are basically those
55. DeWolf v. Harry Cox B.V. (case 42/76, Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties, 1976) [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 43.
56. Bustamante Code, art. 424.
57. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1020 (Costa Rica); CODE CIV. PROC. art. 453 (El Salvador);
CODE PROC. art. 239 (Honduras); CODE CIv. PROc. art. 16(5), 545 (Nicaragua); LAW 47 of
1956, art. 30[3] (Panama).
58. Bustamante Code, art. 426.
59. CODE OF CIV. PROC. art. 240 (Honduras); JUDICIAL CODE, art. 587 (Panama). Nicara-
gua requires notification of the state's representative as a step in the enforcement procedure
in the case of Panamanian judgments and those of other non-Central American countries,
(CODE CIV. PROC. 546), but provides specially for enforcement of other Central American
judgments.
60. Bustamante Code, art. 423.
61. Antill6n, El Auxillo Juridico Internacional en Costa Rica, 15 REViSTA DE CIENCIAS
JURISDICAS 212, 241 (1970).
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provided by the Bustamante Code.62 The Code, however, permits a
state to follow its own rules in matters of competence ratione loci,
if it chooses.6" Thus the enforcing court may use its own compe-
tence rule in some cases to judge the competence of the rendering
court, at least if its rule makes the enforcing state exclusively com-
petent. The competence standards that are relevant in most ac-
tions that can produce money judgments are of the type ratione
loci," and so there is no such no assurance that a set of uniform
competence standards will be applied to determine enforceability
as is the case in the United States (where the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's due process clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause
impose a large measure of uniformity) and in the European Com-
munity (where the convention's competency standards are applied
directly in the rendering court and may not be re-examined).
6 5
The Bustamante Codes6 technically provides for appeal from
the ruling granting or withholding an enforcement decree (called
exeqaatur or parlatis in Central America) but in fact this provi-
sion operates only in Guatemala, since in the other Central Ameri-
can states the highest court in the country is the one that issues
the decree in the first instance.
Comparison of the basic enforcement procedures under the
three systems indicates that the Central American procedure is far
less promotive of the association interests in free mobility of judg-
ments than the other two schemes. A judgment of the highest
court in the land based on a contentious proceeding is required in
all the countries but one and in some of them the state itself par-
ticipates as a party in the proceeding. Proceedings in the high
court are likely to be more costly than the same kind of proceeding
in a lower court of first instance. If the state is an active advocate
in the proceeding, there is a greater likelihood that arguments that
could defeat enforcement will be made and grounds that may be
raised to defeat enforcement are more numerous than those per-
62. Bustamante Code, arts. 314-343.
63. Id. art. 316.
64. Competence ratione loci refers not just to jurisdiction predicated upon the location
of things, but to any rule in which the criterion for identifying the proper court is the loca-
tion of something. The term applies to personal actions in which the proper court is the one
at the domicile of one of the parties, for instance, as well as to real actions. See MuRoz,
CAMY & HALL, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRivADo 214 (1953). See also A. GODOY, I DERECHO
PROCESAL Civm DE GUATEMALA 92 (1973).
65. See infra note 88.
66. Bustamante Code, art. 425.
No. 1]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
mitted to be raised in other systems. Moreover, there is no such
assurance that the standards for resolving those issues will be uni-
form throughout the region as in the United States or the E.E.C.
And even when exequatur is granted by the high court, further
proceedings in a lower court are necessary before there is actual
enforcement.
The Central American scheme is more costly, more complex,
and less likely to produce predictable results. The additional cost
and complexity does not yield any greater protection to the legiti-
mate interests of the individual parties. It serves no interest of the
plaintiff. It aids the defendant by making enforcement more diffi-
cult to obtain, but the defendant arguably has no legitimate inter-
est in avoiding enforcement unless there was some fundamental
unfairness about the proceeding in the rendering court. The
United States and E.E.C. have provisions to protect the defendant
from enforcement of a judgment obtained through such a proceed-
ing at less cost to the association interests than under the Central
American scheme. It is doubtful that the local interests served are
worth the cost and complexity of the Central American system. No
reason is apparent, other than tradition, for requiring the partici-
pation of the highest court in the land in the enforcement of every
ordinary civil money judgment. Guatemala found it possible to dis-
pense with that requirement with no apparent injury to its na-
tional dignity and sovereignty. It would surely be a step forward if
the other Central American countries were to adopt a procedure
like that of Guatemala, at least for the enforcement of judgments
of other Central American states. Cases presenting serious ques-
tions of interpretation of the association's Charter or of local pub-
lic policy should be reviewed in the Supreme Court. Ordinary
cases, however, could certainly be disposed of in a court of first
instance with ample protection to individual and local policy inter-
ests and less sacrifice of association interests.
B. Kinds of Judgments Subject to Enforcement
In the United States, every money judgment is entitled to en-
forcement in every other state, with the possible exception of a
"penal" judgment.6 7 Even money awards issued by administrative
tribunals are entitled to full faith and credit.68 Arbitration awards,
67. See CASAD, supra note 42, at 286-87.
68. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 435 (1943).
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however, and settlement agreements that are not embodied in offi-
cial decrees are not constitutionally required to be enforced in
other states, although many states do grant enforcement to such
private arrangements.
The European Common Market Convention extends enforce-
ment to all "civil and commercial" judgments, except certain kinds
that are specially noted. 9 The characterization as civil or commer-
cial turns on the nature of the cause of action, not upon the nature
of the rendering tribunal. The nature of the cause of action is de-
termined by reference to a common but unwritten standard deriv-
ing from the "objectives and scheme of the convention" and gener-
ally accepted principles. 0 Doubts are resolved in favor of the civil
or commercial characterization, 71 and so most kinds of money
judgments in private actions will be enforceable under the conven-
tion, except those specifically noted. Arbitration awards are not
covered by the 1968 convention, but there are other treaties and
conventions that do provide for their enforcement.
7 2
In Central America virtually any private money judgment is
enforceable. The Bustamante Code declares that "Every civil and
contentious administrative judgment... may be executed. . ..",3
"Civil" in this passage is construed broadly, and does not refer to
the character of the rendering tribunal or to the particular code
that provides the substantive principles. Even penal judgments can
be enforced to the extent that they include civil elements- i.e.,
an award of damages for the victim. 74 Arbitration awards are also
made enforceable if the subject of the arbitration is such that it
69. Convention, supra note 44, at art. 1.
70. Lufttransportunternehmen Gmbh. & Co. K.G. v. Organisation Europeenne Pour La
Securite de la Navigation Aerienne (Eurocontrol), Case 29/76 Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities) [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep., 1541, 1551.
71. Hay, The Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention of the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments-Some Considerations of Policy and Interpretation, 16 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 149, 154 (1968).
72. See Jenard Report, at 24.
73. See Bustamante Code, art. 423. The provision for execution of contentious-adminis-
trative judgments as well as civil judgments is curious, since the defendant in such cases is
nearly always the foreign state or one of its agencies, and the situations in which the courts
of one country could exercise jurisdiction over another country or its properties must be rare
indeed. See Bustamante Code, arts. 333-339. The only extra-territorial effect that could be
given to a contentious-administrative judgment, apparently, would be a non-conclusive evi-
dentiary effect. See WORKING DocuMENr, SECOND INTER-AMERIcAN SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, RECOGNITION AND EXECUTION OF FOREIGN JUDICIAL JUDG-
MENTS, 17-18 (OEA/SER. K./XXI.2) (June 1977).
74. Bustamante Code, art. 437.
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could have been a subject of "compromise" under the law of the
enforcing state.7 5 In a few countries it is possible to obtain enforce-
ment of ex parte judicial orders directing the defendant to pay
money.76 Although some of the Central American states made ex-
press reservations affecting recognition of some kinds of judg-
ments,7 these reservations have rarely been invoked.
C. Competency and Jurisdiction Standards
A fundamental condition of enforcement in all the systems we
are comparing is that relating to the competency or jurisdiction of
the rendering court. The rendering court must have been compe-
tent both under its own and under "international" standards. 8
The purpose of superimposing a requirement of competency
by international standards over the requirement of jurisdiction
under the rendering court's own standards is to protect the inter-
est of the defendant in not having to defend himself in a forum
lacking the minimal connections to the parties and the case to sat-
isfy universal notions of fairness. It also serves to protect any in-
terests the enforcing state may have in providing the forum for the
resolution of the issues in the underlying controversy. This latter
interest is particularly strong when the enforcing state is the exclu-
sive forum under its own law. If the enforcing state and the render-
ing state are members of an association of states, an association
interest may also be served by the international competency stan-
dards in seeking to channel the litigation to the most convenient or
appropriate forum, even if that is a third state.
The particular international competency standards recognized
in all three of the regimes we are comparing generally foster these
interests. However, they differ in the extent to which they permit
these interests to prevail over competing interests such as the
plaintiff's interest in forum choice, and the overall interest in expe-
ditious judgment enforcement.
75. Id. art. 432.
76. These are the "judgments of sale," (sentencias de remate). See 5 ALSINA, DERECHO
PROCESAL 184-86 (1962). See also CODE CIv. PRoc., art. 431 (Costa Rica) and CODE Civ.
PROC. art. 549 (Nicaragua).
77. See note 17 supra.
78. In the E.E.C. Convention, the rendering court's competency is prescribed by the
Convention itself, and so there are not in fact two sets of standards. E.E.C. Convention, art.
5. In the Bustamante Code, the requirement of competence under the rendering court's own
rules is implicit in the requirement that the judgment be "executory" in the state of rendi-
tion. Bustamante Code, art. 423[4].
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In the United States system, the "international" jurisdiction
standards are the same as those minimal standards prescribed by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 These
standards focus upon the defendant's connection with the render-
ing state. The defendant must have such contacts with the forum
state as to make it reasonable under traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice to require him or her to defend the particu-
lar lawsuit in that forum. Even under this test, however, before
1977 it was generally assumed that in one situation a state court
could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a defendant in an
in personam action having no reasonable connection with the fo-
rum state: where the defendant was physically served with process
within the boundaries of that state. The United States Supreme
Court in 1977, however, seemingly eliminated that possibility, de-
claring that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be judged
by the "minimum contact-fundamental fairness" criteria first an-
nounced in International Shoe Corp. v. State of Washington." If
physical presence has thus been eliminated as a sufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction, a defendant cannot now be sued in a state
with which he or she has not voluntarily formed some contact rele-
vant to the action unless he or she consents to such jurisdiction. If
a judgment is obtained against him or her in a state lacking such
contacts, the judgment is not entitled to recognition or enforce-
ment in other states.
The American standard overtly seeks to insure basic fairness,
but it is so vague that different courts can reach different conclu-
sions in applying the standard to similar facts. In the American
scheme since the enforcing state can make an independent deter-
mination of the rendering court's jurisdiction, the vagueness of the
standard means that substantial review authority is lodged in the
court of the enforcing state. This problem is relieved by two fac-
tors. The first is the possibility of ultimate review in the Supreme
Court of the United States of state court rulings on the application
of "international standards." The second stems from our concep-
tion of res judicata in its issue preclusion aspect. The enforcing
court can review the basis of the rendering court's jurisdiction, but
if that issue was actively litigated in the rendering court, the par-
ties are precluded from relitigating in the enforcing court the ren-
79. See note 30 supra.
80. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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dering court's ruling.8' A defendant is entitled to challenge the ren-
dering court's jurisdiction only once either in the rendering court
or the enforcing court. If the defendant challenges it in the render-
ing court and loses (or makes a general appearance in the render-
ing court without challenge,) the defendant can be precluded from
making the challenge in the enforcing court. It should be noted
that in the American scheme, unlike that of the E.E.C. Conven-
tion, the rendering court is under no obligation to inquire into the
basis for its jurisdiction in personam unless the defendant raises
the issue as a defense.
Another consequence of the broadness of the standards within
the United States is that they may authorize the exercise of juris-
diction concurrently in several states. For instance, a suit for dam-
ages for breach of contract between a resident of state A and a
resident of state B calling for performance in both states C and D,
could possibly be brought in any of the four states without violat-
ing the constitutional standards. Assume that a suit is brought
against the state A resident in state D, and a default judgment is
obtained there which is then submitted for enforcement in state A,
the judgment debtor's domicile. The American scheme permits the
defendant to raise an objection to state D's jurisdiction in the state
A enforcement action, but the objection probably would not suc-
ceed since state D would probably have sufficient minimal con-
tacts. Does this scheme adequately protect the defendant's interest
and the enforcing state's own interest in providing a forum for
suits against its domiciliaries? The American answer to that ques-
tion is yes. Our conception of fairness in the matter of personal
jurisdiction consciously recognizes the need to balance the inter-
ests of the defendant and those of the plaintiff, of the forum state
and other potential fora, and the overall interests of judicial ad-
ministration in a federal system.82 The defendant does not have an
absolute right to be sued in the state of his or her domicile. If there
are alternative fora, the plaintiff (who must bear the burden of ul-
81. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
82. "[Due Process] demands ... such contacts of the [defendant] with the state of the
forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require
the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An 'estimate' of the
inconveniences which would result to the [defendant] from a trial away from its 'home' or
principal place of business is relevant in this connection .... Whether due process is satis-
fied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure." International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17, 319 (1945).
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timate persuasion in the merits of the case) is generally permitted
to choose the one in which to proceed.
The American system does permit the defendant to exert
some influence on forum selection. Under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, a defendant sued in a seriously inconvenient fo-
rum can appeal to the discretion of the forum court to dismiss the
action.8 3 The factors relevant to deciding whether dismissal for fo-
rum non conveniens is appropriate are the same ones that are rel-
evant in determining whether the minimal contacts necessary for
due process are present, but the jurisdictional standard may some-
times be met in a case where the forum is nevertheless seriously
inconvenient. Forum non conveniens is not a constitutional doc-
trine, but is recognized in most states as a common law principle.
Thus it is a generally available means by which the defendant can
influence the choice among alternative permissible fora.
In addition to forum non conveniens a defendant sued outside
his or her home state may be able to remove the action from the
state court to a federal court." Once the case is removed to a fed-
eral court, the defendant may then apply for a transfer of venue of
the action to another federal court where it might have been
brought, if it is more convenient for the parties and the witnesses
and furthers the interests of justice. 5 The standards for venue
transfer from one federal court to another are not so rigorous as
those that must be met under the forum non conveniens doctrine
and the focus is upon convenience, not "serious inconvenience."
These devices supply substantial protection to the defendant's
interest in spite of the very permissive standards of international
jurisdiction recognized in the United States today. The association
interest in channeling the litigation to the most appropriate forum
is significantly protected, although the protection depends upon
the defendant's acting to invoke one of these protective measures.
The enforcing state's interest in providing the exclusive forum, like
the association interest, is served if, but only if, the defendant
chooses to counter the plaintiff's forum choice. Since basic proce-
dures are the same in all American states, and even the substantive
laws are very similar in most kinds of cases likely to produce civil
money judgments. The interest of any one state in providing the
83. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 320 U.S. 501 (1947).
84. Removal is permitted only if the plaintiff or plaintiffs are all citizens of states dif-
ferent than that of the defendant and more than $10,000 is in controversy. 28 U.S.C. 1332.
85. 28 U.S.C. 1404(a).
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exclusive forum for a given action is not likely to be as strong as
that of an individual sovereign state in the other systems we are
comparing. Thus, measures to protect particular states' exclusive
forum interests are not so important in the American scheme.
The jurisdictional standards prescribed by the E.E.C. Conven-
tion are expressed in much more specific terms than those based
upon the United States Constitution, and their application is quite
different." Under the E.E.C. Convention the competency stan-
dards are applied directly by the rendering court, and it must rule
on that issue, whether or not the defendant objects even if the de-
fendant defaults. The rendering court's determination of compe-
tency is not subject to any review by the enforcing court.87 By pro-
viding more specific standards to be directly and conclusively
applied by the rendering court, the E.E.C. Convention avoids some
of the uncertainty that the American system entails, but it is also
much more restrictive of the plaintiff's range of forum choice.
A defendant domiciled in the European community is subject
to suit in the state of his or her domicile.88 Defendant's consent or
voluntary general appearance89 can make a non-domiciliary court
competent unless the case is one for which the convention provides
that a particular state is exclusively competent. 90 In addition, an
alternative forum is provided for certain specific kinds of cases:
e.g., contract cases, place of performance; tort cases, place of the
tortious act.9 1 Special provisions are also made for cases involving
insurance92 and consumer transactions.9 ' The provisions for these
special cases identify states with particular significant contacts
with the case. These contacts would undoubtedly be sufficient to
justify requiring a non-consenting non-resident to defend there
under American standards, too. Thus, competency for a suit
against a domiciliary of one of the member nations would not be
recognized under the E.E.C. standards. American standards being
less specific, permit jurisdiction in some cases in states that, how-
86. Convention, supra note 44, at arts. 2-18.
87. Id. art. 28.
88. Id. art. 2. The law of the forum is to be applied in determining domicile. Id. art. 52.
89. Id. art. 18.
90. See Id. art. 16; Notable are actions involving rights in rem in real property which
may be brought only in the courts at the situs. See also Id. art. 17, dealing with prorogation
agreements.
91. Id. art. 5.
92. Id. arts. 7-12a.
93. Id. arts. 13-15.
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ever, would not be competent under the E.E.C. standards. Never-
theless, in most cases the standards of the two systems would lead
to essentially similar results. One case in which the E.E.C. Conven-
tion standards may be more permissive than those of the United
States involves multiple defendants resident in different countries.
Under the convention all may be sued in the domicile of any one of
them.9 4 Domicile of a co-defendant has not been regarded as an
adequate basis for personal jurisdiction in America. In this situa-
tion the difference between the European concept of "competency"
to entertain the action and the American concept of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is apparent.
The E.E.C. standards although not expressed in terms that in-
vite interest balancing do seem to aim at striking a balance be-
tween the interests of the individual and the states. The defendant
is protected against having to defend in a seriously inconvenient
forum by the specification of only certain states in which an action
can be brought without his consent. The "exorbitant" bases of ju-
risdiction which the laws of some of the individual countries other-
wise would permit are expressly excluded when the defendant is a
domiciliary of one of the contracting states.95 Individual states' in-
94. Id. art. 6.
95. Id. art. 3. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 53.
The most commonly cited of these rules of exorbitant jurisdiction are the following:.
1) In France and Luxembourg jurisdiction can be predicated on the basis of the plain-
tiff's nationality. See CODE Civ. art. 14(France). Thus, a Frenchman, even if not domiciled
in France, can obtain a judgment in a French court against a non-French defendant domi-
ciled outside the Common Market, even though the cause of action is unrelated to France.
2) German courts can exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the presence of assets within
Germany, and the judgment is not limited to the value of the assets themselves. See Zivil-
prozessordnung [ZPO] art. 23 (W. Ger.) (CODE CIV. PROC.).
3) A Dutch court can entertain a suit against a non-domiciliary on the basis of the
plaintiff's Netherlands domicile. CODE CIV. PRoc. art. 120(3) (Netherlands).
4) In Ireland and the United Kingdom, jurisdiction may be predicated on the tempo-
rary presence of a defendant within the territory of the forum. In the United Kingdom, too,
limited quasi in rem jurisdiction may be based on the presence of property.
These "exorbitant" bases may be utilized in cases involving defendants who are not
domiciled in one of the contracting states, and judgments obtained on such bases then be-
come enforceable throughout the entire Common Market region. Convention, supra note 44,
at art. 4. This provision of the convention has provoked a great deal of criticism, particu-
larly from the United States. See Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgment Convention
and a Hague Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HAxv. L. REV. 1232
(1969); Nadelman, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judg-
ments: The Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 995 (1967). See also Hay, supra note
71, at 149; and Carl, The Common Markets Convention-Its Threat and Challenge to
Americans, 8 INm. LAW. 446 (1974).
It means that member states of the Common Market can adjudicate cases against non-
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terests in providing the forum for the action are given greater
weight than is true in the American scheme, since the convention
recognizes some states as having exclusive competence for some
cases, an exclusivity that cannot be circumvented even by the de-
fendant's consent."8 The greater importance placed on individual
state's forum interests would not be appropriate in a federal union
such as the United States, where all states' procedural rules are
very similar.
The international competence standards embodied in the Bus-
tamente Code are narrower than in the other two systems men-
tioned. For ordinary civil and commercial actions, a plaintiff has
no forum choice. If the parties expressly or impliedly consent to a
particular court's competency, that will be the competent court if
one of the parties is a domiciliary or national of that country.w
Otherwise, the competent court is the one where the obligation
that is the subject of the action is to be performed.9 If no place is
specified, or if the action does not concern an obligation to be per-
formed, the court of the defendant's domicile or residence will be
community defendants on the so-called "exorbitant" jurisdictional bases recognized by some
of the member states, and the judgments thus rendered are entitled to automatic recogni-
tion and enforcement throughout the community without re-examination of the jurisdiction
of the rendering court. The fact that the convention framers have been willing to extend the
principle of automatic enforcement to judgments resting on these "exorbitant" jurisdictional
bases tends to emphasize how important the matter of judgment recognition is regarded.
The patent unfairness to non-community defendants resulting from the extension of
the effects of these "exorbitant" jurisdictional bases to the whole Common Market region
cannot be avoided even by the enforcing court's invoking the "public policy" exception.
Convention, supra note 44, art. 28. Provision is made for the avoidance of the obligation to
enforce such judgments, however, through bilateral or other treaty agreements between indi-
vidual member states and non-member countries. Id. art. 59. Thus the United States, for
instance, could avoid the extraterritorial enforcement within the Common Market of judg-
ments rendered against American domiciliaries based on "exorbitant" jurisdiction by negoti-
ating bilateral treaties with each of the member states, or through such an arrangement as
the proposed Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, reprinted in 15 AM. J. CoMP. L. 362 (1967).
A bilateral treaty, recently initialled, between the United States and the United King-
dom could become a model for treaties with other Common Market nations which would
provide protection to American defendants from judgments obtained through resort to "ex-
orbitant" jurisdictional bases. See Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition of Judgments
Convention Between the United States and the United Kingdom, 11 TEx. INTL. L.J. 421
(1976). The apparent abolition of one of our own "exhorbitant" jurisdictional bases by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) may make it
easier for our negotiators to arrange such conventions.
96. Convention, supra note 44, arts. 16, 18.
97. Bustamante Code, art. 318.
98. Id. art. 323.
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competent.99 All this presupposes that the laws of the rendering
courts also recognize the court prescribed by the Bustamante Code
as competent. The Bustamante Code's jurisdiction provisions,
thus, do not establish any firm uniform standards of international
competence that will apply in all cases to determine the enforce-
ability of a foreign judgment.
By expressly making its jurisdictional prescriptions subordi-
nate to local law, the Bustamante Code seems to go far beyond the
American or E.E.C. schemes in extending protection to the enforc-
ing state's interests. Under the Bustamante Code the enforcing
court can also make its own determination of the rendering court's
competency under international standards and there is no single
tribunal as there is in the United States, whose interpretation
must be followed by all states. The Bustamante Code may even
permit a reexamination of the facts on which the rendering court's
competency rested, even though the facts were contested and spe-
cifically determined in the rendering court.100 Thus, neither of the
factors which in the American system tend to eliminate the uncer-
tainty caused by allowing the enforcing court to review the render-
ing court's competency is present in the regime of the Bustamante
Code.
Since the Bustamante Code was not drafted as a vehicle for
promoting regional integration, it is understandable that it permits
more latitude for the enforcing state's local interests. This defer-
ence to the- enforcing state seems inappropriate for a Central
American regime. In terms of basic law and procedure, the Central
American states are more similar to each other than are the coun-
tries of the E.E.C. Accordingly, local forum interests would seem to
be less important. Moreover, by thus reducing the number of cases
in which automatic enforcement is prescribed while providing no
alternative fora for the plaintiff's original action, the Bustamante
Code unduly favors the defendant. In addition, a defendant may
have two chances to challenge the rendering court's competency;
once in the rendering court itself, and again in the enforcing court.
In the E.E.C. system all challenges must be made in the rendering
court. In the American system a challenge may be made in one or
the other, but not both.
99. Id.
100. See ORTiZ, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PIVADO EN COSTA RICA 292 (1969). The
doctrine of collateral estoppel which serves to permit relitigation of jurisdictional facts in
the American system has no application in the Latin American concept of cosa juzgada.
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The Bustamante Code's scheme of competency standards
then, is significantly less conducive to the expeditious enforcement
of civil judgments than are the other two systems. The individual
law and practices of the particular countries of Central America
apparently contain nothing to make regarding competency stan-
dards enforcement more readily available than under the Busta-
mante Code's scheme. The only exception might be the Nicara-
guan scheme, where a special law governs enforcement of
judgments of Central American states.101 The author could find no
cases that would suggest any real difference between Nicaragua's
treatment of Central American judgments and those of other Bus-
tamante Code signatories.
D. Notice Requirements and Default Judgments
All of the systems under examination provide that before a
sister state money judgment is entitled to enforcement it must ap-
pear that the defendant was adequately notified of the action
against him in the rendering court and that he had an adequate
opportunity to defend. However, the defendant's voluntary partici-
pation in the action on the merits without objecting to any defect
in the notice will always foreclose this issue as a grounds for chal-
lenging the judgment in the enforcing state.10 2 Thus, the notice
factor is a defense to enforcement only in the case of a default
judgment, or in a case where the defendant raised unsuccessfully
an objection to the notice element in the rendering court.
In the United States the notice requirement is combined with
the requirements relating to the bases of personal jurisdiction in
the federal constitutional requirement of due process. Each state
prescribes its own procedures for notification of the defendant, but
the procedures must conform to a federal standard. The prescribed
procedure must provide reasonable assurance that the defendant
will receive actual notice in time to adequately prepare a defense.
Actual notice, however, is neither necessary nor sufficient to satisfy
the constitutional requirement. At one time service by publication
or posting notice was considered adequate for some kinds of
cases-even some in personam actions. Today such notice will not
101. This law appears as Articles 9-20, Code of Civil Procedure of Nicaragua. It
originated in an instrument called the Central American Procedure Convention of 1892.
102. Under the European Convention the right to resist enforcement on grounds of lack
of notice is extended only to a "defaulting defendant." Convention, supra note 44 art. 27
[2]; Bustamante Code, art. 423 [2].
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suffice for defendants whose identity and whereabouts are known.
Notice by mail sent to the defendant's last known address is prob-
ably adequate in most cases.103
In the United States the defense of lack of notice can only be
raised to resist judgment enforcement in the case of a default judg-
ment in which the defendant made no appearance whatsoever in
the rendering court. A defendant who made a special appearance
in the rendering court and unsuccessfully challenged the suffi-
ciency of the notice or service cannot again assert the same chal-
lenge in a later enforcement action. A defendant's only recourse
against an unfavorable ruling in that case is to appeal the resulting
judgment in the rendering court," with possible ultimate review in
the Supreme Court of the United States.
1 04
A defendant who made no appearance at all in the rendering
court and suffered a default judgment can challenge the jurisdic-
tional adequacy of the notice later in an enforcement action. De-
fendants can challenge the adequacy of the process by which they
were served both under the law of rendering state itself and under
federal constitutional standards. Even if the judgment formally re-
cites that proper service and notice were effected the enforcing
court can make its own determination of the facts based on an evi-
dentiary hearing and, if it finds that the facts do not show that the
prescribed procedure was followed, or, if it was, that the procedure
did not comport with due process standards, enforcement may be
denied. The plaintiff seeking enforcement can appeal the denial of
enforcement with possible ultimate review in the Supreme Court of
the United States.
The E.E.C. Convention contains two separate provisions rec-
ognizing the importance of adequate notice to the defendant in the
rendering court. If a defendant domiciled in a state other than the
one in which the action is brought, makes no appearance in the
action, the judge of the rendering court is required to stay the ren-
dition of judgment until the plaintiff adequately establishes that
the "defendant has been able to receive the document instituting
the proceedings or an equivalent document in time to enable him
to arrange for his defense, or that all necessary steps have been
103. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
104. Cf. Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522 (1931), where the
jurisdictional defect concerned the basis element rather than the form and adequacy of no-
tice. The same principle applies in both situations, however.
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taken to this end." 10 5 This means that the defaulting defendant
must have been served personally or served at his domcile with
sufficient time to defend.108 It is not necessary to show that defen-
dant actually received the notice; it is enough to show that the
plaintiff took all the steps required by the law of the rendering
state (or the appropriate convention of service outside the state is
required by "good conscience and good faith").
10 7
The E.E.C. convention's treatment of the question of compe-
tency and that of notice in a default case are similar. The render-
ing court must make a finding on the question even if the defen-
dant makes no objection. However, the convention also permits the
enforcing court to consider the notice factor in a default case-
even when the defendant was not domiciled outside the rendering
state.10 8
The question arises whether this permits the enforcing court
to make an independent determination of the adequacy of notice,
even after the rendering court has passed on the question. Nothing
in the text of the convention precludes such an interpretation.
However, the Jenard Report indicates that a second, independent
review by the enforcing court of the fact and timing of notice is not
contemplated. 109 A determination by the rendering court that no-
tice was adequately and timely served, then precludes considera-
tion of the same question by the enforcing court, even if the defen-
dant did not object in the rendering court. Thus, the convention
seeks to protect the defendant's right to notice and an opportunity
to defend, but does not go so far as the American scheme in grant-
ing the defendant a right to actively litigate that issue. If the de-
fendant did get notice of the action, and had an objection to the
form or timing of it, the interests of effective judicial administra-
tion reasonably require that the objection be made in the render-
ing court before judgment-while the proceeding is stayed for that
very purpose. While the E.E.C. Convention does not guarantee the
defendant a day in court on the issue of adequacy of notice in all
cases, it protects a defendant's legitimate interests while serving
the interests of interstate enforceability of judgments even better
105. Convention, Article 20.
106. Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 68-69. What is a sufficient time to defend is not
defined in the convention itself, and so it is a factor on which judges may differ.
107. Id. at 69.
108. Convention, supra note 44, art. 27 [2].
109. Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 76-77.
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than does the American scheme in this respect. It eliminates the
possibility of collateral attack in the enforcing court in many kinds
of cases where the American scheme would permit it.
The Bustamante Code, too, establishes as a condition of en-
forcement the requirement that the defendant must have been offi-
cially served, either personally or by representative." 0 Presumably
this requirement is not available as a defense to enforcement when
the defendant participated on the merits without objection in the
rendering court."" The code apparently permits the enforcing
court to consider the propriety of service even when the question
was raised and decided in the rendering court. Even if the code did
not authorize such review of the service by the enforcement court,
due service and notice are generally regarded as matters of "public
order" in Central American countries, and enforcement may be de-
nied on that alternative ground.
The Central American regime appears to be at least as zealous
about protecting the defendant's right to adequate notice in the
original action as the American and E.E.C. systems. However, it
appears less concerned with promoting certainty and expeditious-
ness in judgment enforcement in that it does not provide limits on
the defendant's right to challenge the sufficiency of the notice in
the enforcement action. In view of this defect, a better balance of
the relevant interests seems desirable.
E. Finality Factors
Each of the three systems under examination extends enforce-
ability to final money judgments that could be executed in the ren-
dering state if the defendant had any property there. There are,
however, some interesting differences among the three systems in
the kinds of judgments that are enforceable, other than, final judg-
ments for a fixed sum of money.
In the United States enforceability extends to "final" judg-
ments. A judgment is not final until the trial judge has performed
every judicial act necessary to entitle the judgment to be given ef-
fect in the rendering state. When it becomes "final" in the render-
ing state, it is subject to enforcement in a sister state, even if the
judgment can still be appealed in the rendering state."' Enforce-
110. Bustamante Code, art. 423 [2].
111. Cf. note 103 supra.
112. See UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGmENTS ACT § 6.
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ment is normally stayed, however, if an appeal is taken.
The American principle of "finality" causes problems in appli-
cation to judgments calling for future installment payments. Such
judgments are common in the areas of domestic relations-alimony
and support decrees-and, in some states, worker's compensation.
Although the trial judge may have done all that is required to
make the installments collectible by execution as they fall due, the
passage of time is still a condition precedent to enforceability. Fu-
ture installments are not "final" till the time for payment of each
sum falls due.11
In the European Common Market Convention, a judgment be-
comes enforceable in another state as soon as it becomes enforcea-
ble in the rendering state,114 but it will not be so enforceable so
long as appeal is possible in the rendering state.1 5 In the E.E.C.
Convention most installment payment judgments which cause "fi-
nality" problems in the American system, are simply excluded. Ar-
ticle 1 of that convention specifically excludes its application to
revenue, customs and administrative matters as well as to matters
of status and marriage regimes, and to social security matters
(which include cases comparable to worker's compensation)."' The
main reason for exclusion is the recognition that in such matters
the public policies of the individual states assume greater impor-
tance than in the case of ordinary civil and commercial judgments,
and the assumption was that no single scheme could be adopted
that would command uniform respect throughout the region.
1 7
Thus, these matters are left up to individual state law, or to sepa-
rate treaty.
The Bustamante Code recognizes as enforceable only judg-
ments that are "executory" in the rendering state.11 8 Basically, this
provision is like the E.E.C. Convention's requirement of enforce-
ability. In the Bustamante Code, no express exclusion is made re-
lating to enforcement of installment payment judgments. However,
each state is granted the right to recognize or not divorces granted
113. See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
Some states, although not required to do so, recognize the judgments for future install-
ments. See, e.g., Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955); Light v. Light, 12
Ill. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1957); UN'onRm LAWS ANNOTATED 9(C).
114. Convention, supra note 44, art. 31.
115. See Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 82.
116. See Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 23.
117. Id. at 19.
118. Bustamante Code, art. 423 [4].
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abroad with effects not admitted by the personal law of the par-
ties."" This, coupled with the general public policy exception, im-
pedes enforcement of alimony and support decrees that do not
conform to local law. Where public policy is not at stake, presum-
ably installment judgments can be enforced, at least for accrued
arrearages.
One other aspect of the "finality" requirement in American
law merits special attention. The "finality" requirement means
there is no constitutional obligation upon one state to effectuate a
summons, subpoena, attachment, or other interlocutory order is-
sued by a court in another state. States will often agree to serve
summonses or even subpoenas issued by courts in other
states-but the practice is not uniform. Curiously, for reasons
probably attributable to our use of attachment and quasi in rem
jurisdiction as a procedural substitute for personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, American states have not developed a practice
of honoring attachment, garnishment or sequestration orders is-
sued by out-of-state courts.120
The E.E.C. Convention1 21 and the Bustamante Code122 both
recognize the interstate enforceability of attachment orders, al-
though enforcement may be denied on public policy grounds in
some Central American states.
F. Reciprocity
A common feature of judgment enforcement regimes of many
individual countries is the limitation of enforcement to judgments
of those countries which will grant reciprocal treatment to the
judgments issued by the courts of the enforcing state. This require-
ment is completely eliminated, however, with respect to the judg-
ments of sister states within the United States and the European
Common Market. All states are similarly bound by the same basic
rules, and thus there is no room within those systems for differ-
ences that might lead to a reciprocity requirement.
The fact that all the Central American countries are signato-
ries of the Bustamante Code also would seem to eliminate reci-
119. Id. art. 53.
120. This practice may now be under development, however, in the wake of Justice
Marshall's express invitation in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977). This was done
in Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 Fed. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
121. See Convention, supra note 44, art. 24.
122. Bustamante Code, arts. 388-393.
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procity as a factor to be considered in the enforcement proceeding
among those states even when the enforcement state's own law in-
sists upon reciprocity as a condition of enforcement of foreign
judgments generally. However, the fact that some of the countries
accepted the Bustamante Code only with reservations and the fact
that the Code leaves several important matters to be determined
by local law means that the Code does not operate in the same way
in all countries, and so reciprocity is not ensured by the Code. The
lack of reciprocity is a defense to enforcement of a sister state's
judgment in at least one Central American country.12 While reci-
procity has not been viewed by the other Central American coun-
tries as a condition to the enforcement of judgments emanating
from Bustamante Code countries, the possibility of its invocation
does exist. The reciprocity factor is a potential obstacle to the real-
ization of a judgment enforcement system in Central America as
effective as those of the United States and the European
Community.
G. Public Policy
Nearly all judgment enforcement schemes recognize an excep-
tion to the obligation of enforcement when the effect would be con-
trary to some strongly held policy principles of the enforcement
state. Since "public policy" in this context is rarely defined, this
exception introduces a potential source of uncertainty into the
judgment recognition regime.124 The degree to which the associa-
tion interests and other interests that would be served by expedi-
tious enforcement must yield to local interests of the enforcing
state though this exception depends upon how broadly or narrowly
the enforcing state construes its public policy. If the public policy
exception is broad enough to apply in any case in which the legal
principles of the rendering court differ from those that would have
been applied if the action had originally been brought in the en-
forcing court, there will be very few instances of interstate judg-
ment enforcement unless the states have virtually identical bodies
of substantive law. The problem of placing limits on the public
policy exception so that it does not virtually destroy the recogni-
123. Honduras, for example. This point rests upon the author's examination of several
Pareatis decisions of the Supreme Court of Honduras. (Pareatis is the term used in El
Salvador and Honduras instead of exequatur). See Pareatis decisions of Dec. 29, 1960; Aug.
7, 1953, Nov. 18, 1941, and July 3, 1942.
124. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1670.
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tion and enforcement scheme has been troublesome to all regional
systems.
The solution to the problem in the United States is simply to
eliminate local public policy as a defense to enforcement of a sister
state judgment.12 Federal constitutional law overrides local law
and policy, and the federal policy of ready and expeditious judg-
ment enforcement is given precedence over any local substantive
policy concerns. If the conditions were present for the exercise of
jurisdiction by the rendering court then the question of what
state's policy should supply the substantive principles ought to be
raised and altered there. Whether or not the issue is actually
raised, however, once a judgment has been rendered, that question
is foreclosed from collateral review.
This solution to the public policy problem, however, gives rise
to problems of its own. Since American federal law leaves the mat-
ter of choice of law up to individual states, with very little federal
constitutional restraint, there may be no corrective if the rendering
court should apply rules of decision that thwart important sister
state policy interests, which in a totally rational system should be
honored. This might lead one to believe that this feature of the
American system attributes excessive weight to ready interstate
enforcement at the expense of local substantive policy interests of
a state other than the rendering state. However, in a federal sys-
tem where state laws and policies are so similar as in the United
States, local policy concerns probably should be given considerably
less weight than would be true in the case of a less thoroughly inte-
grated group of states.
A "public policy" exception is expressly recognized in the
E.E.C. scheme,1 26 although the committee that drafted the conven-
tion suggested that the exception could properly be invoked only
in extraordinary cases.1 27 For one thing, the convention expressly
excludes from its coverage certain kinds of cases that are likely to
provoke the enforcing court to apply the public policy exception,
e.g., family law cases, social security, etc. Their exclusion in effect
recognizes a region-wide principle that in such cases local interests
are more important than the basic association interest in interstate
judgment enforcement. One state can refuse to enforce another's
judgment in one of the excluded types of chses without invoking
125. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
126. Convention, supra note 44, art. 27 [1].
127. See Jenard Report supra note 4, at 75.
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the general public policy exception. In addition, the convention
contains provisions that prevent the use of the public exception as
a device to permit the enforcing state to review the jurisdiction
and choice of law rules applied by the rendering court. Jurisdic-
tional rules are not proper subjects of the public policy exception,
no matter how "exorbitant" they may be.12 8 By expressly making
the rendering court's choice of law subject to review in the enforc-
ing court in certain kinds of cases, Article 27(4) impliedly estab-
lishes that choice of law rules are not subject to review in other
kinds of cases and accordingly, that such rules are not proper sub-
jects of the public policy exception. The mere fact that the sub-
stantive principles underlying the judgment are different than
those the enforcing state would apply does not trigger the excep-
tion. The convention's drafting committee expressed the view that
it is not the foreign judgment itself that is to be examined in the
light of local public policy, but the recognition of it. 129 The E.E.C.
regime also contains a check against a misinterpretation by a local
court of the permissible scope of the public policy exception. The
General Treaty of the E.E.C. provides for an authoritative inter-
pretation by the European Court of Justice, binding all participant
states.130 Such judicial review is not compulsory, as is the United
States Supreme Court's jurisdiction to interpret our constitutional
scheme, but it does serve as a potential check on the public policy
exception recognized by the E.E.C. Convention.
The public policy exception in the Central American system is
free to operate virtually without restraint. Technically it is not an
exception but a condition of enforceability. The Bustamante Code
prescribes, as a condition to enforcement of a foreign judgment
"that the judgment does not conflict with the public policy or the
public laws of the country in which execution is sought .... 11
The term "public laws" should be read as "public law," a term that
generally refers to laws regulating relations between persons and
the state. Thus, the enforcing state's "public law" can always pre-
vent the enforcement of a sister state judgment.
The term "public policy" presumably refers to something dif-
ferent. It is generally understood to refer to that body of laws and
precepts of the enforcing state that would be characterized as laws
128. Convention, supra note 44, art. 28.
129. Jenard Report supra note 4, at 76.
130. E.E.C. Treaty, art. 177.
131. Bustamante Code, art. 423 [a].
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of "international public order" in Bustamante's terminology.13 2
This concept is so vague and confusing as to make it nearly mean-
ingless as a prescriptive term.133 Only rules that are considered
very important to the society of the enforcing state deserve such
characterization, but, there is no standard by which to gauge "im-
portance". Family law rules relating to basic procedural fairness,
and all constitutional precepts are common exaibples of matters of
"public policy". 4 As in the E.E.C. regime, it is not necessary to
invoke the public policy exception to avoid enforcing judgments
involving certain family law matters that conflict with local policies
of the enforcing state.3 5 Local policy of the enforcing state is ex-
pressly given precedence over the association interest in recogni-
tion and enforcement in these cases. Nevertheless, the Central
American states refusing recognition and enforcement to such
judgments usually do so on grounds of "public policy," adding un-
necessarily to the freight that concept has to carry.
The absence of any clear concept of public policy and the ab-
sence of any unifying tribunal to supply narrowing interpretations
binding all states in the association means that each state is free to
determine for itself what the "public policy" exception will cover.
This is a potential source of great uncertainty in the Central Amer-
ican judgment enforcement regime. The exception does not seem
to have posed much of a threat to the enforcement of money judg-
ments in ordinary commercial or contract cases, but in the realm of
labor law, and other branches of law where the public interest is
more apparent, the exception is an inhibition to ready enforceabil-
ity. In one Guatemalan case the public policy exception was in-
voked to prevent the recognition and enforcement in Guatemala of
a provisional attachment issued in a tort action by a Costa Rican
court against property in Guatemala of a Guatemalan corporation.
The Bustamante Code prescribes enforcement of such provisional
attachments, but the Guatemalan appellate court ruled that to
132. Article 3 of the Bustamante Code declares that laws are divided into three classes:
"1) Laws of an internal public order, or personal laws; 2) Laws of an international public
order, or territorial (or "local") laws; and 3) Laws of a private order, or voluntary laws."
133. For a discussion of the difficulty of ascertaining the meaning of those classifica-
tions, see Lorenzen, supra note 13, at 499.
134. See Bustamante Code, art. 4.
135. The Code, for example, allows each state "to permit or recognize, or not, the di-
vorce of new marriage of persons divorced abroad, in cases, with effects or for causes which
are not admitted by their personal law." Id. art. 53.
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give it effect in Guatemala would violate public policy.38 The case
illustrates the potential of the public policy doctrine for introduc-
ing further uncertainty into the Central American judgment en-
forcement regime in an area specifically covered by the Code.
One might think that an association of states with as much in
common as those of the Central American isthmus-whose laws,
policies, official language and basic social institutions are more
similar to each other's than are those of the states of the E.E.C.,
and who officially declare themselves to be separate elements of a
single nation1 37 -could go further in subordinating local policy in-
terests to the association interests in free mobility of judgments
than could the nations of the European Community. At present,
however, the Central American regime permits the enforcing state
to construe its public policy as broadly as it sees fit, with no effec-
tive check. This is a serious obstacle to an optimally effective judg-
ment recognition scheme.
H. Res Judicata-Cosa Juzgada
Our comparisons herein have dealt with issues related to the
enforcement of simple civil money judgments. Such judgments
may have other extraterritorial consequences besides enforceability
which must be considered in any comparative examination of the
three systems. These other extraterritorial consequences are the
res judicata (or cosa juzgada) effects of the judgments. According
to the common law doctrine of res judicata as followed generally in
the United States, a judgment can affect future litigation between
the same parties in two different ways. It may preclude a later suit
on the same claim, and it may preclude relitigation of the same
issues. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the federal constitution
gives these preclusive effects nationwide operation. If a judgment
of State A will preclude a later suit on the same claim in State A it
will also preclude a later suit on the same claim as State B. If an
adjudication in State A has conclusively established certain ulti-
mate facts as between two parties, that same conclusive effect
must be recognized in a suit between those parties in State B.13s
136. Jose Antonio Copa Lopez v. Juez Quinto de Primera Instancia de lo Civil, Ex-
pediente #719, Sala Primera, Corte de Apelaciones (1969). The Supreme Court reversed the
ruling on other grounds but did not overrule the public policy conclusion.
137. See note 7 supra.
138. The recent decision in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., U.S., 100 S. Ct. 2647
(1980) raises some question about the application of this principle in the context of workers'
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Nationwide operation of res judicata conserves the judicial re-
sources of the nation. The losing party's interests are protected by
limiting the operation of res judicata to judgments that are juris-
dictionally valid and final. Jurisdictional safeguards protect against
a grossly unfair forum choice and unfair procedure; the finality re-
quirement insures that conclusive effect will not be given to a rul-
ing that could still be changed by the original court. Furthermore,
claim preclusion will not result unless the judgment was "on the
merits". Issue preclusion effect will not be given except to issues
that were actually contested and decided and which were necessary
to the judgment rendered. Some other limitations may also be im-
posed to assure that a proper balance is struck between goals of
the doctrine of res judicata and the protection of the losing party's
interests.
Res judicata operates without formal procedure. No separate
judgment of the enforcing state, such as is usually required for en-
forcement, is necessary to entitle a sister state judgment to recog-
nition for its res judicata effect. The judgment need only be
presented in duly authenticated form to the trial court in the
pending action in the recognizing state. The United States system,
then, ascribes to sister state judgments conclusive effects as broad
as those a judgment would have in the rendering state, and it dis-
penses with all formalities for the recognition of those effects, ex-
cept rudimentary requirements of proof.
The system of the E.E.C. Convention is similar to that of the
United States in eliminating the need for special formalities (other
than proof of judgment) when recognition, as opposed to enforce-
ment, is sought for a sister state judgment.139 It is similar, too, in
compensation claims. In that case the court permitted an injured workman to claim recov-
ery both under Virginia law and that of the District of Columbia. The plurality opinion
declared that "the Full Faith and Credit clause should not be construed to preclude succes-
sive workmen's compensation awards" (at 2663), although the issue preclusion effect of the
first state's proceeding had to be recognized by the second. The majority of the court, how-
ever, disagreed with the view that workmen's compensation awards are not entitled to full
faith and credit for their claim preclusion effects. And even the plurality was careful to
point out that it did not intend the proposition it supported to extend to judgments of
courts of general jurisdiction. Accordingly, the case probably should not be understood as
weakening the statement made in the text except in the workmen's compensation context,
where successive awards have been permitted anyway in most situations since Industrial
Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 67 S. Ct. 886, 91 L. Ed. 1140 (1947).
139. Convention, supra note 44, art. 26. If, however, recognition is sought, not as inci-
dental to an action commenced for an independent purpose, but as an end in itself, the
formalities prescribed for enforcement must be followed. Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 74.
No. 1]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
that the judgment entitled to recognition is to be accorded the
same conclusive effect in the recognizing state as it has in the ren-
dering state. 140 Its operation is different from that of the United
States system, however, in that European law simply does not at-
tribute such extensive effects to judgments as does the common
law of the United States. 41 Claim preclusion operates in a much
narrower scope than in the latter system. It prevents the later ac-
tion only when the same "object" and "cause" as were presented in
the first action are involved in the second. Normally the combina-
tion of these elements will be present in fewer cases than those
which would involve the "same claim or cause of action" as under-
stood in American law. Moreover, issue preclusion is not recog-
nized at all. Judgments may be used as evidence on issues, but are
not conclusively dispositive, as is the case in the United States.
Although the scope of res judicata is thus limited, the E.E.C. Con-
vention serves to project throughout the whole community such
conclusive effect as the judgment has in the state of rendition, and
that effect can be realized without any special proceedings.
The scheme of the E.E.C. Convention, unlike that of the
United States, does not permit the conclusive effect of a sister
state judgment to be avoided by a collateral attack on the judg-
ment for want of jurisdiction (competence). Like the United States
scheme, however, it sometimes permits a challenge in the recogniz-
ing state to the adequacy of the service and notice given to the
defendant in the original action.142 Unlike the system of the United
States, the conclusive effect of a sister state judgment can also be
challenged on grounds of the public policy of the recognizing state,
although, as noted above, the "public policy" objection does not
have such a wide scope in the E.E.C. scheme as it does in the pri-
vate international law doctrines of most individual countries. Also
unlike the American practice, recognition need not be accorded to
a judgment of a sister state if there has been an incompatible judg-
ment between the same parties in the recognizing state. This point
will be examined in the next section.
All in all, the interstate res judicata effects of judgments
among the nations of the E.E.C. are of lesser scope than is true
140. Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 74.
141. See HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, 554-55 (1967); CAPPELLETTI & PERILLO,
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY, 253-54 (1965); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1674-
75.
142. See Convention, supra note 44, art. 27[2]; Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 76-77.
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among states of the United States.
Latin American law is basically the same as that of France and
Italy on the question of the scope and effects of res judicata (cosa
juzgada).143 The effects are much more limited than is true in the
American scheme. The Bustamante Code's treatment of recogni-
tion of judgments for purposes of res judicata is confusing at best.
Two separate provisions of the code refer to the problem, and they
do not fit neatly together. Article 431 declares as follows:
Final judgments rendered by a contracting State which by reason
of their pronouncements are not to be executed shall have in the
other States the effects of res judicata if they fulfill the conditions
provided for that purpose by this Code, except those relating to
their execution.
Article 396 provides:
The plea of res judicata founded on a judgment of another con-
tracting party shall lie only when the judgment has been rendered
in the presence of the parties or their legal representatives, and
no question founded on the provisions of this Code has arisen as
to the competence of the foreign court.
By authorizing recognition for judgments incapable of execution
does Article 431 mean that executable judgments for which en-
forcement has not been sought are not to be recognized for their
res judicata effects at all? If so, then a plaintiff who has once ob-
tained a money judgment in a sister state cannot be prevented
from suing again on the original claim rather than seeking enforce-
ment in another state. The defendant would not be able to raise
the defense of res judicata against such an action, because the ear-
Her judgment would be executable. The plaintiff would have an op-
tion to sue on the original claim or to enforce the judgment in an-
other state. This would constitute a significant difference between
the regime of the Bustamante Code and those of the E.E.C. and
the United States. Latin American practice, however, has not fol-
lowed this reading.
Perhaps Article 431 should be read to mean that executable
judgments are entitled to recognition, but that in the case of exe-
cutable (as opposed to non-executable) judgments all the condi-
tions, including those for execution, must be satisfied. This, how-
ever, would be an anomalous requirement to impose upon a
143. See 1 M. AGURE, DERECHO PROCESAL CIML D. GUATEMALA, 789-822 (1973).
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defendant who sought recognition for the foreign judgment to pre-
vent a suit by the plaintiff on the original claim. Probably the most
sensible reading of Article 431 is to simply ignore the reference to
non-executable judgments as ill-considered surplusage.1"
Another problem is whether an order of exequatur must be
obtained before a judgment can be recognized for its res judicata
effects in those countries that require exequatur in connection
with enforcement. In Central America (and elsewhere in Latin
America) some of the states have taken the position that exe-
quatur is required even when only recognition of the sister state
judgment is concerned. 45 Others have ruled that exequatur is nec-
essary only when enforcement is sought.14 Thus, in some countries
of Central America a formal decree of the highest court in the land
is necessary before a sister state judgment will be entitled to recog-
nition for even the limited effects that Latin American cosa juz-
gada doctrine covers. This may be understandable in the case of
recognition of divorce or other status decrees, but otherwise it is
difficult to see any rational justification for this serious impairment
of the association interest in the free mobility of judgments. Is any
local interest of the recognizing state or any individual interest of
any party protected by the exequatur requirement that is not oth-
erwise adequately served? None is apparent.
Apart from the inhibiting effect of the exequatur requirement,
which is limited to only some of the countries, the Central Ameri-
can scheme contains some other impediments to ready recognition
that make recognition of sister state judgments less likely there
than under the American and E.E.C. regimes. All of the defenses
that can be asserted to resist enforcement of a sister state judg-
ment (except, perhaps, lack of executoriness) can be raised against
recognition; lack of competence, inadequate notice, public policy,
etc. This means basically that both the defenses that would be al-
lowed in the United States and those that would be allowed in the
European Community can be asserted in Central America. More-
144. Even such a reading leaves problems unsolved. It is unclear whether the Article
431 conditions, which must be met for res judicata, refer to those prescribed in Article 396
or those prescribed in Article 423 of the Code, or both. Most jurists have assumed that
conditions of Articles 396 and 423 must be met. Bustamante Code, arts. 396, 423, 431.
145. See M. SENTIs, LA SENTENCIA ExTRANJERA 66, 78 (1958).
146. See 3 H. ALSINA, TRATADO TE6ico PRACTICO DE DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COM-
MERICAL 127 (1943). 3 A. BusTr mrE, DERECHO INTERNACIONAIL PaivADo 285 (1931). See
Discussion in Lucas, Eficacia de la Sentencia Extranjera, in PROBLEMATICA ACTUAL DEL
DERECHO PROCESAL 597-607 (A. Morello ed. 1974).
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over, the "public policy" defense is broader than under the Euro-
pean scheme.147 In addition, the Bustamante Code seems to impose
a stricter standard for recognition than for enforcement in its pro-
vision that "no question" must have arisen as to the competence of
the rendering court.148 This would seem to bar recognition if a sub-
stantial question of competence was raised-whether or not it was
resolved-in either the rendering or recognizing court. Odd though
it may seem, this probably is what Bustamante himself
intended.
149
The extent to which the res judicata effect of judgment can
operate throughout the region is far less in Central America than
among the states of either the United States or of the European
Community. Yet, it would seem that judgment recognition should
be at least as broadly effective among the Central American states
as among the European, if not so broadly as in the United States.
I. Inconsistent Judgments and Pending Actions
Two common problems concerning recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments are 1) what significance should be
placed on the fact that an independent action on the claim embod-
ied in the judgment is pending at the time recognition or enforce-
ment is sought; and 2) what significance should be placed on the
fact that another judgment already exists inconsistent with the one
for which recognition or enforcement is sought. The two problems
are discussed together here because of the common concern, un-
derlying both, with the need to avoid conflicting judicial com-
mands. 50
147. If the official English translation of Article 396 is taken at face value even compli-
ance with all the prescribed formalities for notice to the defendant in the rendering state
will not entitle the judgment to recognition if the defendant or his representative was not in
fact "present." No recognition, in other words, could be extended to default judgments, even
though such judgments may be enforceable. This is probably not the meaning intended,
however. The Spanish term "comparecencia," translated as "presence," probably means in-
stead "being made a party, by appearance or due citation." Cf. A. BUSTAMANTE, supra note
147, at 287.
148. Bustamante Code, art. 396.
149. In his treatise, discussing this article, Bustamante speaks, not of the lack of com-
petence, but doubt as to the competence of the rendering tribunal. A. BUSTAMANTE, supra
note 147, at 285.
150. See Id. at 281-82. "A dual interest-that of the administration of justice and that
of the parties-demands that there be but one single litigation or process for each matter.
This spares the individuals trouble and useless expenditures; the public administration an-
noying duplications and perhaps sterile results; and the concept and application of law the
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The American system generally tolerates the simultaneous
pendency of two different actions on the same basic subject in dif-
ferent states. Two actions pending in the same state may invoke
local procedural rules for consolidation, but these rules do not op-
erate across. state lines. A court in one state may seek to enjoin the
prosecution of an action in another state, but the court in the sec-
ond state is not bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to rec-
ognize or enforce such a decree.151 There is, then, no generally ef-
fective deterrent to concurrent litigation of the same claim in more
than one state, except practical considerations of cost and
convenience.
Although actions can legally proceed simultaneously, when one
of the claims is resolved in a judgment for or against the claimant,
the obligation of full faith and credit arises and the second court
must recognize the res judicata effect. Even if the action pending
in the second state was commenced before the one in the sister
state now concluded in judgment, the pendency of that action is
not a defense to the recognition or enforcement of the sister state
judgment.
Res judicata is a defense to be asserted by a party, not an is-
sue the court will raise on its own motion. 152 It sometimes happens
that the existence of the judgment is not called to the attention of
the court in which another action on the same claim is pending.
When this occurs, a second judgment on the same claim may be
rendered. This second judgment may or may not be compatible
with the first. The same problem can arise if the first judgment is
asserted as res judicata in the action, but the court erroneously
fails to extend the recognition that full faith and credit requires.
The American system treats the later one as the effective one, 153
even though it was improperly rendered. The remedy against this
kind of erroneous judgment is the same as for erroneous judgments
generally: not collateral attack, but appellate review. Review can
be sought all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, if
necessary. But unless reversed by a higher court, the second of the
two inconsistent judgments is the effective one, and it now is enti-
tled to full faith and credit, i.e., to recognition and enforcement,
danger of divergent and contradictory resolutions."
151. See James v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 14 III. 2d 356, 152 N.E. 2d 858, 862-63"
(1958).
152. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
153. See note 40 supra.
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even in the state where the prior inconsistent judgment was
rendered.
The treatment of these problems in the E.E.C. Convention is
quite different from that in the United States. The basic solution
* to the problem of concurrently pending actions on the same claim
is to require the court in which the later action is brought to de-
clare itself incompetent, leaving only the first action. Temporal
priority in initiating the action determines which action is to be
allowed to proceed.1 5
The convention even goes beyond the problem of concurrent
actions on the same claim and provides also for the case when re-
lated 55 actions are pending. In such a case the court in which the
second action is lodged has discretion to stay its proceedings. It
may even yield jurisdiction at the request of one of the parties, in
order to permit consolidation of the two related actions in the state
in which the first action is pending. This provision for dealing with
related actions operates similarly to the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens in American law. The trial court may, but is not compelled
to, cede jurisdiction to a court in another state where the action
might be brought in the interests of convenience, economy in adju-
dicating the actions simultaneously, and avoidance of incompatible
results.
The convention does not declare any general rule of priority
where two actions do proceed to inconsistent judgments. It does,
however, provide that recognition may be denied if an incompati-
ble judgment was rendered in the very state in which recognition
or enforcement is sought.15 That provision relating to judgments
of the enforcement state, however, is not limited to inconsistent
judgments on the same claim.
157
It makes no difference which judgment was rendered first. If
the two actions were pending at first instance at the same time, the
second one would have been stayed or dismissed in deference to
the one commenced earlier.158 The inconsistent judgment defense,
then, is available only where the actions were not pending at the
same time or where, in spite of the concurrent pendency, the court
in which the later one was brought failed to take the appropriate
154. Convention, supra note 44, art. 21.
155. Id. art. 22.
156. Id. art. 27 [3], [5].
157. See Jenard Report, supra note 4, at 78.
158. Convention, supra note 44, arts. 21-23.
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steps.15 9
It will be noted that the E.E.C. Convention's provision for
dealing with inconsistent judgments, unlike the American solution,
does not eliminate the inconsistency. In fact, it affirms the coexis-
tence within the region of two incompatible judgments-each valid
and invulnerable in the state of its rendition. The American solu-
tion, giving validity to the judgment last in time, probably could
not be adopted by the European system. Basic to the "last in
time" rule is the availability of appellate review in the Supreme
Court of the United States to correct the second court's erroneous
denial of full faith and credit. The European Court of Justice does
not have such general appellate review powers. The E.E.C. Con-
vention could have taken the position that only the first of two
inconsistent judgments could be recognized as valid, but this solu-
tion probably was rejected on the ground that it would simply be
circumvented by the recognizing court's invoking the "public pol-
icy" exception when an inconsistent judgment existed in the recog-
nizing state. The draftsmen of the convention were very concerned
about keeping the public policy exception in check, as discussed
above. The solution adopted-permitting the inconsistent judg-
ments-basically serves the local policy interests of the recognizing
state at the expense of the association interest in uniform ready
enforceability, but does so without expanding the scope of the pub-
lic policy defense.
The convention provides no solution whatsoever for the case
in which a judgment inconsistent with the one for which recogni-
tion is sought was rendered, not in the recognizing state, but in a
third state. The solution to that problem must come from the local
law of the recognizing state, and this means there may be no one
solution uniform throughout the Community.
The Bustamante Code allows but does not require the court of
one state to dismiss the action when another action on the same
claim is pending in another state."1 0 Although inconsistent judg-
ments may result, the Code contains no provision for the case of
inconsistent judgments. If a judgment inconsistent with the one for
which enforcement or recognition is sought has been rendered in
the enforcing state itself, it is to be expected that recognition and
enforcement will be denied on public policy grounds. 6 If the in-
159. See Bustamante Code, arts. 21, 22, 23.
160. Bustamante Code, art. 5.
161. See Antillon, supra note 61.
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consistent judgment is that of a third state, however, no single so-
lution is apparent. The local law of the enforcing state will have to
supply the solution, and this, of course, weakens the effectiveness
of the Code to provide a uniform region-wide judgment enforce-
ment scheme.
J. Comparative Evaluation
This comparison of the three systems shows that in every re-
spect the Central American does not go as far as the others toward
providing expeditious regional recognition and enforcement of sis-
ter state judgments. Although the Bustamante Code applies in the-
ory to more kinds of judicial orders than do the other two, this
advantage is offset by its limitations. The enforcement procedure
in most of the Central American countries is more cumbersome,
the grounds for refusing recognition more numerous, and the con-
ditions upon which recognition can be denied are subject to more
uncertainty and variation than is true in the American and E.E.C.
systems. The international competency standards of the Busta-
mante Code are really not uniform, since the Code defers to local
rules where they conflict with those of the Code in most ordinary
cases. Even in matters where the Code does not defer to local rules,
individual states can reserve the right to apply their own law, thus
preventing the realization of a uniform regionwide system. The
discredited reciprocity requirement does have some force even in
connection with sister-state judgments. The public policy excep-
tion is free to operate without any effective limitation. The rules
relating to recognition of judgments for their res judicata effects
are confusing and ambiguous. There is not even agreement among
the countries as to whether exequatur is required in connection
with mere recognition. There is no provision in the Bustamante
Code for the problem of inconsistent judgments.
In contrast to Central America, the European Economic Com-
munity realized a need "by judicial means to ensure the recogni-
tion and enforcement of the individual rights which will arise from
multiple legal relationships. ' '162 Adoption of the Convention on Ju-
risdiction and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Matters is a
clear attempt to achieve uniformity.'" 3 While conditions for non-
recognition are more numerous in the European system than under
162. See Jenard, supra note 4.
163. Id.
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the full faith and credit regime of the United States, still the bases
of non-enforcement are uniformly set out in the Convention.
16
The weight given to local public policy is a major point of dis-
tinction between the United States system, the E.E.C. system, and
the Central American system. In the United States system, the as-
sociation interest in interstate judgment recognition prevails over
substantive policy interests of the recognizing state. The E.E.C.
and the United States attempt to strike a balance between the in-
terests of the association favoring enforcement, the interests of the
individual parties favoring predictability, and the interests of the
enforcing state favoring preference for local policy and notions of
sovereignty. The Central American system permits much greater
weight to be given to local public policy of the enforcing state sub-
ordinating to that extent the interests of the parties and the asso-
ciation interests.
The doctrine of res judicata, pervasive in the American sys-
tem, is applied more narrowly in the European system. Nonethe-
less, the latter does project throughout the association states the
same res judicata effect a judgment would be given in the render-
ing state itself. No special proceedings are necessary to realize this
effect.165 The Bustamante Code, on the other hand, deals crypti-
cally with recognition as opposed to enforcement. Practice in the
signatory states regarding the matter is inconsistent and unclear, a
substantial hindrance to certainty and uniformity of civil judgment
recognition.
In May 1979, a new convention on judgment recognition was
approved by the Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Private International Law (CIDIP-II) of the Organization of Amer-
ican States. 6 ' It is open for signature and ratification by member
states, and accession by other states. In its final form the conven-
tion is significantly different from two earlier draft proposals made
in 1973167 and 1977.168 The 1973 draft had consciously tried to
draw beneficial ideas from the E.E.C. Convention and other multi-
164. Convention, supra note 44, art. 27.
165. Id. art. 26.
166. OEA/SER. CN1.212.
167. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE, WORK
ACCOMPLISHED BY THE INTER-AMERICAN JUDICIAL COMMITTEE DURING ITS REGULAR MEETING
HELD FROM JULY 26 TO AUGUST 27, 1975, at 99, (CJI-17)(OEA/SER. QIV.7).
168. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE, WORK
ACCOMPLISHED BY THE INTER-AMERICAN JUDICIAL COMMITTEE DURING ITS REGULAR MEETING
HELD FROM JANUARY 10 TO FEBRUARY 18, 1977, (CJI-31) (OEA/SER. Q/IV.14).
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state conventions. It contained two very important provisions that
offered significant promise for a better judgment recognition re-
gime for Latin America. It prescribed international competency
standards, and it called for the elimination of an exequatur pro-
ceeding for the recognition, as contrasted with the execution, of
foreign judgments.
The 1977 draft astonishingly repudiated these features, and
proposed a convention even less satisfactory than the Bustamante
Code it would replace.
The 1979 convention corrected some of the weaknesses of the
1977 version, but the resulting product is a scant improvement
over the Bustamante Code.16 '
A thorough analysis of the new convention must await the
publication of the background documents, but it seems clear that
it will be no more effective a vehicle for an intra-associational judg-
ment recognition scheme for Central America than the present re-
gime. When stability returns to the area, one thing the statesmen
might do to promote more effective integration would be to draw
up a new Central American treaty on judgment recognition, and
implement the Central American Court of Justice.
169. As of September 14, 1979 the new convention had been signed by the following
countries: Brazil (with reservation), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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APPENDIX
Code of Private International Law (Bustamante Code), Annexed
to the Convention
adopted at Habana, February 20, 1928. (Abridged)
ART. 3. For the exercise of civil rights and the enjoyment of
identical individual guarantees, the laws and regulations in force in
each contracting State are deemed to be divided into the three fol-
lowing classes:
I. Those applying to persons by reason of their domicile or
their nationality and following them even when they go to another
country, termed personal or of an internal public order.
II. Those binding alike upon all persons residing in the terri-
tory, whether or not they are nationals, termed territorial, local or
of an international public order.
III. Those applying only through the expression, interpreta-
tion, or presumption of the will of the parties or of one of them,
termed voluntary or of a private order.
ART. 4. Constitutional precepts are of an international public
order.
ART. 5. All rules of individual and collective protection, estab-
lished by political and administrative law, are also of an interna-
tional public order, except in case of express provisions therein en-
acted to the contrary.
ART. 6. In all cases not provided for in this Code each one of
the contracting States shall apply its own definition to the juridical
institutions or relationships corresponding to the groups of laws
mentioned in article 3.
ART. 7. Each contracting State shall apply as personal law that
of the domicile or that of the nationality or that which its domestic
legislation may have prescribed, or may hereafter prescribe.
ART. 8. The rights acquired under the rules of this Code shall
have full extraterritorial force in the contracting States, except
when any of their effects or consequences is in conflict with a rule
of an international public order.
ART. 53. Each contracting State has the right to permit or rec-
ognize, or not, the divorce or new marriage of persons divorced
abroad, in cases, with effects or for causes which are not admitted
by their personal law.
ART. 314. The law of each contracting State determines the
competence of courts, as well as their organization, the forms of
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procedure and of execution of judgments, and the appeals from
their decisions.
ART. 315. No contracting State shall organize or maintain in
its territory special tribunals for members of the other contracting
States.
ART. 316. Competence ratione loci is subordinated, in the or-
der of international relations, to the law of the contracting State
which establishes it.
ART. 317. Competence ratione materiae and ratione personae,
in the order of international relations should not bd based by the
contracting States on the status as nationals or foreigners of the
interested parties, to the prejudice of the latter.
ART. 318. The judge competent in the first place to take cogni-
zance of suits arising from the exercise of civil and commercial ac-
tions of all kinds shall be the one to whom the litigants expressly
or impliedly submit themselves, provided that one of them at least
is a national of the contracting State to which the judge belongs or
has his domicile therein, and in the absence of local laws to the
contrary.
The submission in real or mixed actions involving real prop-
erty shall not be possible if the law where the property is situated
forbids it.
ART. 319. The submission can be made only to a judge having
ordinary jurisdiction to take cognizance of a similar class of cases
in the same degree.
ART. 320. In no case shall the parties be able to submit them-
selves expressly or impliedly for relief to any judge or court other
than that to whom is subordinated according to local laws the one
who took cognizance of the suit in the first instance.
ART. 321. By express submission shall be understood the sub-
mission made by the interested parties in clearly and conclusively
renouncing their own court ahd unmistakably designating the
judge to whom they submit themselves.
ART. 322. Implied submission shall be understood to have been
made by the plaintiff from the fact of applying to the judge in
filing the complaint, and by the defendant from the fact of his hav-
ing, after entering his appearance in the suit, filed any plea unless
it is for the purpose of denying jurisdiction. No submission can be
implied when the suit is proceeded with as in default.
ART. 323. Outside the cases of express or implied submissions,
without prejudice to local laws to the contrary, the judge compe-
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tent for hearing personal causes shall be the one of the place where
the obligation is to be performed, and in the absence thereof the
one of the domicile or nationality of the defendants and subsidia-
rily that of their residence.
ART. 324. For the exercise of real actions in respect to personal
property, the judge of the place where the property is situated
shall be competent, and if it is not known by the plaintiff, then the
judge of the domicile, and in the absence thereof, the one of the
residence of the defendant.
ART. 325. For the exercise of real actions in respect to real
property, and for that of mixed actions to determine boundary and
partition of common property, the competent judge shall be the
one where the property is situated.
ART. 326. If in the cases to which the two preceding articles
refer there is any property situated in more than one of the con-
tracting States, recourse may be had to the judges of any of them,
unless prohibited, as to immovables, by the law of their situation.
ART. 327. In cases relating to the probate of wills or to intes-
tate estates, the competent court will be that of the place in which
the deceased had his last domicile.
ART. 328. In insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings, when the
debtor has acted voluntarily, the judge of the domicile of the latter
shall be the one competent.
ART. 329. In insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings brought by
the creditors the competent judge shall be the one of any of the
places who has cognizance of the claim which gives rise to them,
preference being given, if among them, to that of the domicile of
the debtor if he or the majority of the creditors demand it.
ART. 330. In respect to acts of voluntary jurisdiction, saving
also the case of submission without prejudice to local laws to the
contrary, the competent judge shall be the one of the place where
the person instituting it has or has had his domicile, or if none, his
residence.
ART. 331. Respecting acts of voluntary jurisdiction in commer-
cial matters, apart from the case of submission, without prejudice
to local laws to the contrary, the competent judge shall be the one
of the place where the obligation should be performed or, in the
absence thereof, the one of the place where the event giving rise to
them occurred.
ART. 332. Within each contracting State, the preferable com-




ART. 333. The judges and courts of each contracting State
shall be incompetent to take cognizance of civil or commercial
cases to which the other contracting States or their heads are de-
fendant parties, if the action is a personal one, except in case of
express submission or of counterclaims.
ART. 334. In the same case and with the same exception, they
shall be incompetent when real actions are exercised, if the con-
tracting State or its head has acted on the case as such and in its
public character, when the provisions of the last paragraph of Arti-
cle 318 shall be applied.
ART. 335. If the foreign contracting State or its head has acted
as an individual or private person, the judges or courts shall be
competent to take cognizance of the cases where real or mixed ac-
tions are brought, if such competence belongs to them in respect to
foreign individuals in conformity with this Code.
ART. 336. The rule of the preceding article shall be applicable
to universal causes (juicios universales, e.g., distribution of a
bankrupt's or decedent's effects), whatever the character in which
the contracting foreign State or its head intervenes in them.
ART. 337. The provisions established in preceding articles shall
be applied to foreign diplomatic agents and to the commanders of
war vessels or aircraft.
ART. 338. Foreign consuls shall not be exempt from the civil
jurisdiction of the judges and courts of the country in which they
act, except in respect to their official acts.
ART. 339. In no case can judges or courts adopt coercive or
other measures which have to be executed within the legations or
consulates or their archives, nor in respect to diplomatic or consu-
lar correspondence, without the consent of the respective diplo-
matic or consular agents.
ART. 340. The judges and courts of the contracting State in
which crimes or misdemeanors have been committed are compe-
tent to take cognizance of and pass judgment upon them.
ART. 341. Competence extends to all other crimes and misde-
meanors to which the penal law of the State is to be applied in
conformity with the provisions of this Code.
ART. 342. It also extends to crimes or misdemeanors commit-
ted in a foreign country by national officials enjoying the benefit of
immunity.
ART. 343. Persons and crimes and misdemeanors to which the
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penal law of the respective State does not extend are not subject,
in penal matters, to the competence of the judges and courts of the
contracting States.
ART. 382. The nationals of each contracting State shall enjoy
in each of the others the benefit of having counsel assigned to
them upon the same conditions as natives.
ART. 383. No difference shall be made between nationals and
foreigners in the contracting States in respect to giving security for
judgment.
ART. 384. Aliens belonging to a contracting State may exercise
in the others public rights of action in matters of a penal nature
upon the same conditions as the nationals.
ART. 385. Nor shall those aliens be required to furnish security
when exercising a private right of action in cases in which it is not
required from nationals.
ART. 386. None of the contracting States shall require from
the nationals of another the security judicio sisti nor the onus pro-
bandi in cases where they are not required from its own nationals.
ART. 387. No provisional attachments, bail, or any other mea-
sures of a similar nature shall be authorized in respect to the na-
tionals of the contracting States by reason merely of their being
foreigners.
ART. 388. Every judicial step which a contracting State has to
take in another shall be effected by means of letters requisitorial or
letters rogatory, transmitted through the diplomatic channel. Nev-
ertheless, the contracting States may agree upon or accept as be-
tween themselves any other form of transmission in respect to civil
or criminal matters.
ART. 389. The judge issuing the letters requisitorial is to de-
cide as to his own competence and the legality and propriety of the
act or evidence, without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the judge
to whom said letters are addressed.
ART. 390. The judge to whom such letters requisitorial are sent
shall decide as to his own competence ratione materiae in respect
to the act which he is requested to perform.
ART. 391. The one receiving the letters requisitorial or letters
rogatory should comply, as to the object thereof, with the law of
the one issuing the same, and as to the manner of discharging the
request he should comply with his own law.
ART. 392. The letters requisitorial will be written in the lan-
gnage of the State which sent them and will be accompanied by a
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translation in the language of the State to which they are ad-
dressed, said translation to be duly certified by a sworn public
translator.
ART. 393. Parties interested in the execution of letters re-
quisitorial and rogatory of a private nature should give powers of
attorney, being responsible for the expenses incurred by the same
and by the investigations made.
ART. 394. Litispendencia by reason of a suit in another of the
contracting States may be pleaded in civil matters when the judg-
ment rendered in one of them is to take effect in the other as res
judicata.
ART. 395. In criminal cases the plea of litispendencia by rea-
son of a cause pending in another contracting state shall not lie.
ART. 396. The plea of res judicata founded on a judgment of
another contracting party shall lie only when the judgment has
been rendered in the presence of the parties or their legal repre-
sentatives, and no question founded on the provisions of this Code
has arisen as to the competence of the foreign court.
ART. 397. In all cases of juridical relations subject to this Code
questions of competence founded on its precepts may be addressed
to the jurisdiction of the Court.
ART. 414. If the insolvent or bankrupt creditor has only one
civil or commercial domicile, there can be only one preventive pro-
ceeding in insolvency or bankruptcy, or one suspension of pay-
ments, or a composition (quita y espera) in respect of all his assets
and his liabilities in the contracting States.
ART. 415. If one and the same person or partnership should
have in more than one contracting State various commercial estab-
lishments entirely separate economically, there may be as many
suits for preventive proceeding in bankruptcy as there are commer-
cial establishments.
ART. 416. A decree establishing the capacity of the bankrupt
or insolvent, has extraterritorial effect in each of the contracting
States, upon the previous compliance with the formalities of regis-
tration or publication which may be required by the legislation of
each State.
ART. 417. A decree of bankruptcy or insolvency, rendered in
one of the contracting States, shall be executed in others in the
cases and manner established in this code in respect to judicial res-
olutions; but it shall have the effect of res judicata from the mo-
ment it is made final, as to the persons which it is to affect.
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ART. 418. The powers and functions of the trustees appointed
in one of the contracting States in accordance with the provisions
of this code shall have extraterritorial effect in the others, without
the necessity of any local proceeding.
ART. 419. The retroactive effect of a declaration of bankruptcy
or insolvency and the annulment of certain acts in consequence of
those judgments shall be determined by the law thereof and shall
be applicable to the territory of all the other contracting States.
ART. 420. Real actions and rights of the same nature shall con-
tinue to be subject, notwithstanding the declaration in bankruptcy
or insolvency, to the law of the situation of the things affected
thereby and to the competence of the judges of the place in which
they are found.
ART. 421. The agreement among the creditors and the bank-
rupt or insolvent shall have extraterritorial effect in the other con-
tracting States, saving the right to a real action by the creditors
who may not have accepted.
ART. 422. The rehabilitation of the bankrupt has also extrater-
ritorial validity in the other contracting States, as soon as the judi-
cial resolution by which it is ordered becomes final, and in con-
formity with its terms.
ART. 423. Every civil or contentious administrative judgment
rendered in one of the contracting States shall have force and may
be executed in the others if it combines the following conditions:
1. That the judge or the court which has rendered it have com-
petence to take cognizance of the matter and to pass judgment
upon it, in accordance with the rules of this Code.
2. That the parties have been summoned for the trial either
personally or through their legal representative;
3. That the judgment does not conflict with the public policy
or the public laws of the country in which its execution is sought;
4. That it is executory in the State in which it was rendered.
5. That it be authoritatively translated by an official function-
ary or interpreter of the State in which it is to be executed, if the
language employed in the latter is different.
6. That the document in which it is contained fulfills the re-
quirements necessary in order to be considered as authentic in the
State from which it proceeds, and those which the legislation of
the State in which the execution of the judgment is sought requires
for authenticity.
ART. 424. The execution of the judgment should be requested
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from a competent judge or tribunal in order to carry it into effect,
after complying with the formalities required by the internal
legislation.
ART. 425. In the case referred to in the preceding article, every
recourse against the judicial resolution granted by the laws of that
State in respect to final judgments rendered in a declarative action
of greater import shall be granted.
ART. 426. The judge or tribunal from whom the execution is
requested shall, before decreeing or denying it, and for a term of
twenty days, hear the party against whom it is directed as well as
the prosecuting attorney.
ART. 427. The summons of the party who should be heard
shall be made by means of letters requisitorial or letters rogatory,
in accordance with the provisions of this Code if he has his domi-
cile in a foreign country and lacks sufficient representation in the
country, or in the form established by the local law if he has his
domicile in the requested State.
ART. 428. After the term fixed for appearance by the judge or
the court, the case shall be proceeded with whether or not the
party summoned has appeared.
ART. 429. If the execution is denied, the judgment shall be re-
turned to the party who presented it.
ART. 430. When the execution of judgment is granted, the for-
mer shall be subject to the procedure determined by the law of the
judge or the court for its own judgments.
ART. 431. Final judgments rendered by a contracting State
which by reason of their pronouncements are not to be executed
shall have in the other States the effects of res judicata if they
fulfill the conditions provided for that purpose by this Code, ex-
cept those relating to their execution.
ART. 432. The procedure and effects regulated in the preceding
articles shall be applied in the contracting States to awards made
in any of them by arbitrators or friendly compositors, whenever
the case to which they refer can be the subject of a compromise in
accordance with the legislation of the country where the execution
is requested.
ART. 433. The same procedure shall be also applied in respect
to civil judgments rendered in any of the contracting States by an
international tribunal when referring to private persons or
interests.
ART. 434. The provisions made in acts of voluntary jurisdiction
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regarding commercial matters by judges or tribunals of a con-
tracting State or by its consular agents shall be executed in the
others in accordance with the procedure and the manner indicated
in the preceding article.
ART. 435. The resolutions adopted in acts of voluntary juris-
diction in civil matters in a contracting State shall be accepted by
the others if they fulfill the conditions required by this Code for
the validity of documents executed in a foreign country and were
rendered by a competent judge or tribunal, and they shall in con-
sequence have extraterritorial validity.
ART. 436. No contracting State shall execute the judgments
rendered in one of the others in penal matters in respect to the
sanctions of that class which they impose.
ART. 437. They may, however, execute the said judgments in
respect to civil liability and the effects thereof upon the property
of the convicted person if they have been rendered by a competent
judge or tribunal in accordance with this Code and upon a hearing
of the interested party and if the other conditions of form and pro-
cedure established by the first chapter of this title have been com-
plied with.
CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1968, ON
JURISDICTION AND
THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL MATTERS (AS AMENDED BY THE
CONVENTION ON ACCESSION OF OCTOBER 9,1978
AND ABRIDGED)
(O.J. 1978, L301/77; Cmnd. 7395)
PREAMBLE
The High Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community, desiring to implement the provi-
sions of article 220 of that Treaty by virtue of which they under-
took to secure the simplification of formalities governing the recip-
rocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or
tribunals; anxious to strengthen in the Community the legal pro-
tection of persons therein established; considering that it is neces-
sary for this purpose to determine the international jurisdiction of
their courts, to facilitate recognition and to introduce an expedi-
tious procedure for securing the enforcement of judgments, au-





This Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters
whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. [It shall not extend,
in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters.]
The Convention shall not apply to:
1. the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in prop-
erty arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and suc-
cession;
2. bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding up of insol-
vent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements,






Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domi-
ciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be
sued in the courts of that State.
Persons who are not nationals of the State in which they are
domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable
to nationals of that State.
ARTICLE 3
Persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the
courts of another Contracting State only by virtue of the rules set
out in Sections 2 to 6 of this Title.
[In particular the following provisions shall not be applicable
as against them:
-in Belgium: Article 15 of the civil code (Code civil-Burgerlijk
Wetboek) and Article 638 of the judicial code (Code Judi-
ciare-Gerechtelijk Wetboek),
-in Denmark: Article 248 (2) of the law on civil procedure (Lov
om rettens pleje) and Chapter 3, Article 3 of the Greenland law
on civil procedure (Lov for Gronland om rettens pleje),
-in the Federal Republic of Germany- Article 23 of the code of
civil procedure (Zivilprozessordnung),
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-in France: Article 14 and 15 of the civil code (Code civil),
-in Ireland: the rules which enable jurisdiction to be founded on
the document instituting the proceedings having been served on
the defendant during his temporary presence in Ireland,
-in Italy: Article 2 and 4, Nos. 1 and 2 of the code of civil proce-
dure (Codice di procedura civile),
-in Luxembourg: Articles 14 and 15 of the civil code (Code civil),
-in the Netherlands: Articles 126 (3) and 127 of the code of civil
procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering),
-in the United Kingdom: the rules which enable jurisdiction to
be founded on:
(a) the document instituting the proceedings having
been served on the defendant during his temporary pres-
ence in the United Kingdom; or
(b) the presence within the United Kingdom of property
belonging to the defendant; or
(c) the seizure by the plaintiff of property situated in
the United Kingdom.]
ARTICLE 4
If the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, the
jurisdiction of the courts of each Contracting State shall, subject to
the provisions of Article 16, be determined by the law of that
State.
As against such a defendant, any person domiciled in a Con-
tracting State may, whatever his nationality, avail himself in that
State of the rules of jurisdiction there in force, and in particular
those specified in the second paragraph of Article 3, in the same
way as the nationals of that State.
SECTION 2-SPEcAL JURISDICTION
ARTICLE 5
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another
Contracting State be sued:
1. in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of
performance of the obligation in question;
2. in matters relating to maintenance, in the courts for the place
where the maintenance creditor is domiciled or habitually resi-
dent or, if the matter is ancillary to proceedings concerning the
status of a person, in the court which, according to its own law,
has jurisdiction to entertain those proceedings, unless that juris-
diction is based solely on the nationality of one of the parties;
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3. in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts
for the place where the harmful event occurred;
4. as regards a civil claim for damages or restitution which is
based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings, in the court
seised of- those proceedings, to the extent that that court has ju-
risdiction under its own law to entertain civil proceedings;
5. as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch,
agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place in
which the branch, agency or other establishment is situated;
6. as settlor, trustee or beneficiary of a trust created by the op-
eration of a statute, or by a written instrument, or created orally
and evidenced in writing, in the courts of the Contracting State in
which the trust is domiciled;
7. as regards a dispute concerning the payment of remuneration
claimed in respect of the salvage of a cargo or freight, in the court
under the authority of which the cargo or freight in question:
(a) has been arrested to secure such payment, or
(b) could have been so arrested, but bail or other security has
been given; provded that this provision shall apply only if it is
claimed that the dlefendant has an interest in the cargo or freight
or had such an interest at the time of salvage.
ARTICLE 6
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may also be sued:
1. where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for
the place where any one of them is domiciled;
2. as a third party in an action on a warranty or guarantee or in
any other third party proceedings, in the court seised of the origi-
nal proceedings, unless these were instituted solely with the ob-
ject of removing him from the jurisdiction of the court which
would be competent in his case;
3. on a counter-claim arising from the same contract or facts on
which the original claim was based, in the court in which the orig-
inal claim is pending.
ARTICLE 6A
Where by virtue of this Convention a court of a Contracting
State has jurisdiction in actions relating to liability arising from
the use or operation of a ship, that court, or any other court substi-
tuted for this purpose by the internal law of that State, shall also
have jurisdiction over claims for limitation of such liability.
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SECTION 3-JURISDICTION IN MATTERS RELATING TO INSURANCE
ARTICLE 7
In matters relating to insurance, jurisdiction shall be deter-
mined by this Section, without prejudice to the provisions of Arti-
cles 4 and 5(5).
ARTICLE 8
An insurer domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued:
1. in the courts of the State where he is domiciled, or
2. in another Contracting State, in the courts for the place
where the policyholder is domiciled, or
3. if he is a co-insurer, in the courts of a Contracting State in
which proceedings are brought against the leading insurer.
An insurer who is not domiciled in a Contracting State but has a
branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Contracting
States shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch,
agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State.
ARTICLE 9
In respect of liability insurance or insurance of immovable
property, the insurer may in addition be sued in the courts for the
place where the harmful event occurred. The same applies if mova-
ble and immovable property are covered by the same insurance
policy and both are adversely affected by the same contingency.
ARTICLE 10
In respect of liability insurance, the insurer may also, if the
law of the court permits it, be joined in proceedings which the in-
jured party has brought against the insured.
The provisions of Article 7, 8 and 9 shall apply to actions
brought by the injured party directly against the insurer, where
such direct actions are permitted.
If the law governing such direct actions provides that the pol-
icy-holder or the insured may be joined as a party to the action,
the same court shall have jurisdiction over them.
ARTICLE 11
Without prejudice to the provisions of the third paragraph of
Article 10, an insurer may bring proceedings only in the courts of
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the Contracting State in which the defendant is domiciled, irre-
spective of whether he is the policy-holder, the insured or a
beneficiary.
The provisions of this Section shall not affect the right to
bring a counter-claim in the court in which, in accordance with this
Section, the original claim is pending.
ARTICLE 12
The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by
an agreement on jurisdiction:
1. which is entered into after the dispute has arisen, or
2. which allows the policy-holder, the insured or a beneficiary to
bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this Sec-
tion, or
3. which is concluded between a policy-holder and an insurer,
both of whom are domiciled in the same Contracting State, and
which has the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the courts of
that State even if the harmful event were to occur abroad, pro-
vided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that
State, or
4. which is concluded with a policy-holder who is not domiciled
in a Contracting State, except in so far as the insurance is com-
pulsory or relates to immovable property in a Contracting State,
or
5. which relates to a contract of insurance in so far as it covers
one or more of the risks set out in Article 12.
ARTICLE 12A
The following are the risks referred to in Article 12 (5):
1. Any loss of or damage to
(a) sea-going ships, installations situated off-shore or on
the high seas, or aircraft, arising from perils which relate
to their use for commercial purposes,
(b) goods in transit other than passengers' baggage
where the transit consists of or includes carriage by such
ships or aircraft;
2. Any liability, other than for bodily injury to passengers or
loss of or damage to their baggage,
(a) arising out of the use or operation of ships, installa-
tions or aircraft as referred to in (1)(a) above in so far as
the law of the Contracting State in which such aircraft
are registered does not prohibit agreements on jurisdic-
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tion regarding insurance of such risks,
(b) for loss or damage caused by goods in transit as de-
scribed in (1) (b) above;
3. Any financial loss connected with the use or operation of
ships, installations or aircraft as referred to in (1)(a) above, in
particular loss of freight or charter-hire;
4. Any risk or interest connected with any of those referred to in
(1) to (3) above.
SECTION 4-JURISDICTION OVER CONSUMER CONTRACTS
ARTICLE 13
In proceedings concerning a contract concluded by a person
for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or
profession, hereinafter called "the consumer," jurisdiction shall be
determined by this Section, without prejudice to the provisions of
Articles 4 and 5(5), if it is:
1. a contract for the sale of goods on installment credit terms, or
2. a contract for a loan repayable by installments, or for any
other form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods, or
3. any other contract for the supply of goods or a contract for
the supply of services, and
(a) in the State of the consumer's domicile the conclu-
sion of the contract was preceded by a specific invitation
addressed to him or by advertising, and
(b) the consumer took in that State the steps necessary
for the conclusion of the contract.
Where a consumer enters into a contract with a party who is
not domiciled in a Contracting State but has a branch, agency or
other establishment in one of the Contracting States, that party
shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch,
agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State.
This Section shall not apply to contracts of transport.
ARTICLE 14
A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to
a contract either in the courts of the Contracting State in which
that party is domiciled or in the courts of the Contracting State in
which he is himself domiciled.
These provisions shall not affect the right to bring a counter-
claim in the court in which, in accordance with this Section, the




The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by
an agreement:
1. which is entered into after the dispute has arisen, or
2. which allows the consumer to bring proceedings in courts
other than those indicated in this Section, or
3. which is entered into by the consumer and the other party to
the contract, both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the
contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same Contracting
State, and which confers jurisdiction on the courts of that State,




The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regard-
less of domicile:
1. in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in, or
tenancies of, immovable property, the courts of the Contracting
State in which the property is situated;
2. in proceedings which have as their object the validity of the
constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other
legal persons or associations of natural or legal persons, or the
decisions of their organs, the courts of the Contracting State in
which the company, legal person or association has its seat;
3. in proceedings which have as their object the validity of en-
tries in public registers, the courts of the Contracting State in
which the register is kept;
4. in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of
patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights required to
be deposited or registered, the courts of the Contracting State in
which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken
place or is under the terms of an international convention deemed
to have taken place;
5. in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments,
the courts of the Contracting State in which the judgment has
been or is to be enforced.
SECTION 6-PROROGATION OF JURISDICTION
ARTICLE 17
If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Con-
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tracting State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Con-
tracting State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which
have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular le-
gal relationship, that court or those courts shall have exclusive ju-
risdiction. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be ei-
ther in writing or evidenced in writing or, in international trade or
commerce, in a form which accords with practices in that trade or
commerce of which the parties are or ought to have been aware.
Where such an agreement is concluded by parties, none of whom is
domiciled in a Contracting State, the courts of other Contracting
States shall have no jurisdiction over their disputes unless the
court or courts chosen have declined jurisdiction.
The court or courts of a Contracting State on which a trust
instrument has conferred jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion in any proceedings brought against a settlor, trustee or benefi-
ciary, if relations between these persons or their rights or obliga-
tions under the trust are involved.
Agreements or provisions of a trust instrument conferring ju-
risdiction shall have no legal force if they are contrary to the provi-
sions of Article 12 or 15, or if the courts whose jurisdiction they
purport to exclude have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article
16.
If an agreement conferring jurisdiction was concluded for the
benefit of only one of the parties, that party shall retain the right
to bring proceedings in any other court which has jurisdiction by
virtue of this Convention.
ARTICLE 18
Apart from jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this
Convention, a court of a Contracting State before whom a defen-
dant enters an appearance shall have jurisdiction. This rule shall
not apply where appearance was entered solely to contest the juris-
diction or where another court has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue
of Article 16.
SECTION 7-EXAMINATION AS TO JURISDICTION AND ADMIssmrrY
ARTICLE 19
Where a court of a Contracting State is seised of a claim which
is principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of an-
other Contracting State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Ar-





Where a defendant domiciled in one Contracting State is sued
in a court of another Contracting State and does not enter an ap-
pearance, the court shall declare of its own motion that it has no
jurisdiction unless its jurisdiction is derived from the provisions of
this Convention.
The court shall stay the proceedings so long as it is not shown
that the defendant has been able to receive the document institut-
ing the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to
enable him to arrange for his defence, or that all necessary steps
have been taken to this end.
The provisions of the foregoing paragraph shall be replaced by
those of Article 15 of the Hague Convention of November 15, 1965,
on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in
civil or commercial matters, if the document instituting the pro-
ceedings or notice thereof had to be transmitted abroad in accor-
dance with that Convention.
SECTION 8-Lis PENDENS-RELATED ACTIONS
ARTICLE 21
Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and be-
tween the same parties are brought in the courts of different Con-
tracting States, any court other than the court first seised shall of
its own motion decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.
A court which would be required to decline jurisdiction may
stay its proceedings if the jurisdiction of the other court is
contested.
ARTICLE 22
Where related actions are brought in the courts of different
Contracting States, any court other than the court first seised may,
while the actions are pending at first instance, stay its proceedings.
A court other than the court first seised may also, on the ap-
plication of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the law of that
court permits the consolidation of related actions and the court
first seised has jurisdiction over both actions.
For the purposes of this article, actions are deemed to be re-
lated where they are so closely connected that it is expedient to
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hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcila-
ble judgments resulting from separate proceedings.
ARTICLE 23
Where actions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of several
courts, any court other than the court first seised shall decline ju-
risdiction in favour of that court.
SECTION 9-PROVISIONAL, INCLUDING PROTECTIVE, MEASURES
ARTICLE 24
Application may be made to the courts of a Contracting State
for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be
available under the law of that State, even if, under this Conven-
tion, the courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to
the substance of the matter.
TITLE III-RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
ARTICLE 25
For the purposes of this Convention, "judgment" means any
judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Contracting State,
whatever the judgment may be called, including a decree, order,
decision or writ of execution, as well as the determination of costs
or expenses by an officer of the court.
SECTION 1-RE coGNrTION
ARTICLE 26
A judgment given in a Contracting State shall be recognized in
the other Contracting States without any special procedure being
required.
Any interested party who raises the recognition of a judgment
as the principal issue in a dispute may, in accordance with the pro-
cedures provided for in Sections 2 and 3 of this Title, apply for a
decision that the judgment be recognised.
If the outcome of proceedings in a court of a Contracting State
depends on the determination of an incidental question of recogni-
tion that court shall have jurisdiction over that question.
ARTICLE 27
A judgment shall not be recognized:
[Vol. 4
Civil Judgment
1. if such recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in
which recognition is sought;
2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant
was not duly served with the document which instituted the pro-
ceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time to en-
able him to arrange for his defence;
3. if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a
dispute between the same parties in the State in which recogni-
tion is sought;
4. if the court of the State in which the judgment was given, in
order to arrive at its judgment, has decided a preliminary ques-
tion concerning the status or legal capacity of natural persons,
rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills
or succession in a way that conflicts with a rule of the private
international law of the State in which the recognition is sought,
unless the same result would have been reached by the applica-
tion of the rules of private international law of that State;
5. if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment
given in a non-Contracting State involving the same cause of ac-
tion and between the same parties, provided that this latter judg-
ment fulfills the conditions necessary for its recognition in the
State addressed.
ARTICLE 28
Moreover, a judgment shall not be recognized if it conflicts
with the provisions of Section 3, 4 or 5 of Title II, or in a case
provided for in Article 59.
In its examination of the grounds of jurisdiction referred to in
the foregoing paragraph, the court or authority applied to shall be
bound by the findings of fact on which the court of the State in
which the judgment was given based its jurisdiction.
Subject to the provisions of the first paragraph, the jurisdic-
tion of the court of the State in which the judgment was given may
not be reviewed; the test of public policy referred to in Article 27
(1) may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction.
ARTICLE 29
Under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed
as to its substance.
ARTICLE 30
A court of a Contracting State in which recognition is sought
of a judgment given in another Contracting State may stay the
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proceedings if an ordinary appeal against the judgment has been
lodged.
A court of a Contracting State in which recognition is sought
of a judgment given in Ireland or the United Kingdom may stay
the proceedings if enforcement is suspended in the State in which
the judgment was given by reason of an appeal.
SECTION 2-ENFORCEMENT
ARTICLE 31
A judgment given in a Contracting State and enforceable in
that State shall be enforced in another Contracting State when, on
the application of any interested party, the order for its enforce-
ment has been issued there.
However, in the United Kingdom, such a judgment shall be
enforced in England and Wales, in Scotland, or in Northern Ire-
land when, on the application of any interested party, it has been
registered for enforcement in that part of the United Kingdom.
ARTICLE 32
The application shall be submitted:
-in Belgium, to the tribunal de premiere instance or rechtbank
van eerste aanleg,
-in Denmark, to the underret,
-in the Federal Republic of Germany, to the presiding judge of a
chamber of the Landgericht,
-in France, to the presiding judge of the tribunal de grande
instance,
-in Ireland, to the High Court,
-in Italy, to the corte d'appello,
-in Luxembourg, to the presiding judge of the tribunal
d'arrondissement,
-in the Netherlands, to the presiding judge of the
arrondissementsrechtbank,
-in the United Kingdom:
1. In England and Wales, to the High Court of Justice,
or in the case of a maintenance judgment to the Magis-
trates' Court on transmission by the Secretary of State;
2. in Scotland, to the Court of Session, or in the case of
a maintenance judgment to the Sheriff Court on trans-
mission by the Secretary of State;
3. in Northern Ireland, to the High Court of Justice, or
in the case of a maintenance judgment to the Magistrates'
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Court on transmission by the Secretary of State.
The jurisdiction of local courts shall be determined by refer-
ence to the place of domicile of the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought. If he is not domiciled in the State in which en-
forcement is sought, it shall be determined by reference to the
place of enforcement.
ARTicLE 33
The procedure for making the application shall be governed
by the law of the State in which enforcement is sought.
The applicant must give an address for service of process
within the area of jurisdiction of the court applied to. However, if
the law of the State in which enforcement is sought does not pro-
vide for the furnishing of such an address, the applicant shall ap-
point a representative ad litem.
The documents referred to in Articles 46 and 47 shall be at-
tached to the application.
ARTicLE 34
The court applied to shall give its decision without delay; the
party against whom enforcement is sought shall not at this stage of
the proceedings be entitled to make any submissions on the
application.
The application may be refused only for one of the reasons
specified in Articles 27 and 28.
Under no circumstances may the foreign judgment be re-
viewed as to its substance.
ARTICLE 35
The appropriate officer of the court shall without delay bring
the decision given on the application to the notice of the applicant
in accordance with the procedure laid down by the law of the State
in which enforcement is sought.
ARTicLE 36
If enforcement is authorised, the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought may appeal against the decision within one month
of service thereof.
If that party is domiciled in a Contracting State other than
that in which the decision authorising enforcement was given, the
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time for appealing shall be two months and shall run from the date
of service, either on him in person or at his residence. No extension
of time may be granted on account of distance.
ARTICLE 37
An appeal against the decision authorising enforcement shall
be lodged in accordance with the rules governing procedure in con-
tentious matters:
-in Belgium, with the tribunal de premiere instance or
rechtbank van eerste aanleg,
-in Denmark, with the landsret,
-in the Federal Republic of Germany, with the Ober-
landesgericht,
-in France, with the cour d'appel,
-in Ireland, with the High Court,
-in Italy, with the corte d'appello,
-in Luxembourg, with the Cour sup6rieure de justice sitting as a
court of civil appeal,
-in the Netherlands, with the arrondissementsrechtbank,
-in the United Kingdom:
1. in England and Wales, with the High Court of Jus-
tice, or in the case of a maintenance judgment with the
Magistrates' Court;
2. in Scotland, with the Court of Session, or in the case
of a maintenance judgment with the Sheriff Court;
3. in Northern Ireland, with the High Court of Justice,
or in the case of a maintenance judgment with the Magis-
trates' Court.
The judgment given on the appeal may be contested only:
-in Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, by
an appeal in cassation,
-in Denmark, by an appeal to the hojesteret, with the leave of
the Minister of Justice,
-in the Federal Republic of Germany, by a Rechtsbeschwerde,
-in Ireland, by an appeal on a point of law to the Supreme
Court,
-in the United Kingdom, by a single further appeal on a point of
law.
ARTICLE 38
The court with which the appeal under the first paragraph of
Article 37 is lodged may, on the application of the appellant, stay
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the proceedings if an ordinary appeal has been lodged against the
judgment in the State in which that judgment was given or if the
time for such an appeal has not yet expired; in the latter case, the
court may specify the time within which such an appeal is to be
lodged.
Where the judgment was given in Ireland or the United King-
dom, any form of appeal available in the State in which it was
given shall be treated as an ordinary appeal for the purposes of the
first paragraph.
The court may also make enforcement conditional on the pro-
vision of such security as it shall determine.
ARTzcLE 39
During the time specified for an appeal pursuant to Article 36
and until any such appeal has been determined, no measures of
enforcement may be taken other than protective measures taken
against the property of the party against whom enforcement is
sought.
The decision authorising enforcement shall carry with it the
power to proceed to any such protective measures.
ARTICLE 40
If the application for enforcement is refused, the applicant
may appeal:
-in Belgium, to the cour d'appel or hof van beroep,
-in Denmark, to the landsret,
-in the Federal Republic of Germany, to the Oberlandesgericht,
-in France, to the cour d'appel
-in Ireland, to the High Court,
-in Italy, to the corte d'appello,
-in Luxembourg, to the Cour sup6rieure de justice sitting as a
court of civil appeal,
-in the Netherlands, to the gerechtshof,
-in the United Kingdom:
1. in England and Wales, to the High Court of Justice,
or in the case of a maintenance judgment to the Magis-
trates' Court;
2. in Scotland, to the Court of Session, or in the case of
a maintenance judgment to the Sheriff Court;
3. in Northern Ireland, to the High Court of Justice, or
in the case of a maintenance judgment to the Magistrates'
Court.
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The party against whom enforcement is sought shall be sum-
moned to appear before the appellate court. If he fails to appear,
the provisions of the second and third paragraphs of Article 20
shall apply even where he is not domiciled in any of the Con-
tracting States.
ARTICLE 41
A judgment given on an appeal provided for in Article 40 may
be contested only:
-in Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, by
appeal in cassation,
-in Denmark, by an appeal to the hojesteret, with the leave of
the Minister of Justice,
-in the Federal Republic of Germany, by a Rechtsbeschwerde,
-in Ireland, by an appeal on a point of law to the Supreme
Court,
-in the United Kingdom, by a single further appeal on a point of
law.
ARTICLE 42
Where a foreign judgment has been given in respect of several
matters and enforcement cannot be authorised for all of them, the
court shall authorise enforcement for one or more of them.
An applicant may request partial enforcement of a judgment.
ARTICLE 43
A foreign judgment which orders a periodic payment by way
of a penalty shall be enforceable in the State in which enforcement
is sought only if the amount of the payment has been finally deter-
mined by the courts of the State in which the judgment was given.
ARTICLE 44
An applicant who, in the State in which the judgment was
given, has benefited from complete or partial legal aid or exemp-
tion from costs or expenses, shall be entitled, in the procedures
provided for in Articles 32 to 35, to benefit from the most favour-
able legal aid or the most extensive exemption from costs of ex-
penses provided for by the law of the State addressed.
However, an applicant who requests the enforcement of a de-
cision given by an administrative authority in Denmark in respect
of a maintenance order may, in the State addressed, claim the ben-
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efits referred to in the first paragraph if he presents a statement
from the Danish Ministry of Justice to the effect that he fulfils the
economic requirements to qualify for the grant of complete or par-
tial legal aid or exemption from costs or expenses.
ARTICLE 45
No security, bond or deposit, however described, shall be re-
quired of a party who in one Contracting State applies for enforce-
ment of a judgment given in another Contracting State on the
ground that he is a foreign national or that he is not domiciled or
resident in the State in which enforcement is sought.
SECTION 3 COMMON PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 46
A party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement of a
judgment shall produce:
1. a copy of the judgment which satisfies the conditions nec-
essary to establish its authenticity;
2. in the case of a judgment given in default, the original or a
certified true copy of the document which establishes that the
party in default was served with the document instituting the pro-
ceedings or with an equivalent document.
ARTICLE 47
A party applying for enforcement shall also produce:
1. documents which establish that, according to the law of the
State in which it has been given, the judgment is enforceable and
has been served;
2. where appropriate, a document showing that the applicant is
in receipt of legal aid in the State in which the judgment was
given.
ARTICLE 48
If the documents specified in Article 46(2) and 47(2) are not
produced, the court may specify a time for their production, accept
equivalent documents or, if it considers that it has sufficient infor-
mation before it, dispense with their production.
If the court so requires, a translation of the documents shall
be produced; the translation shall be certified by a person qualified
to do so in one of the Contracting States.
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ARTICLE 49
No legalisation or other similar formality shall be required in
respect of the documents referred to in Article 46 or 47 or the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 48, or in respect of a document ap-
pointing a representative ad litem.




A document which has been formally drawn up or registered
as an authentic instrument and is enforceable in one Contracting
State shall, in another Contracting State, have an order for its en-
forcement issued there, on application made in accordance with
the procedures provided for in Article 31 et seq. The application
may be refused only if enforcement of the instrument is contrary
to public policy in the State in which enforcement is sought.
The instrument produced must satisfy the conditions neces-
sary to establish its authenticity in the State of origin.
The provisions of Section 3 of Title III shall apply as
appropriate.
ARTICLE 51
A settlement which has been approved by a court in the course
of proceedings and is enforceable in the State in which it was con-
cluded shall be enforceable in the State in which enforcement is
sought under the same conditions as authentic instruments.
TITLE V-GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 52
In order to determine whether a party is domiciled in the Con-
tracting State whose courts are seised of a matter, the Court shall
apply its internal law.
If a party is not domiciled in the State whose courts are seised
of the matter, then, in order to determine whether the party is
domiciled in another Contracting State, the court shall apply the
law of that State.
The domicile of a party shall, however, be determined in ac-
cordance with his national law if, by that law, his domicile depends
[VoL 4
Civil Judgment
on that of another person or on the seat of an authority.
ARTICLE 53
For the purpose of this Convention, the seat of a company or
other legal person or association of natural or legal persons shall be
treated as its domicile. However, in order to determine that seat,
the court shall apply its rules of private international law.
In order to determine whether a trust is domiciled in the Con-
tracting State whose courts are seised of the matter, the court shall
apply its rules of private international law.
TITLE VI-TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 54
The provisions of this Convention shall apply only to legal
proceedings instituted and to documents formally drawn up or reg-
istered as authentic instruments after its entry into force.
However, judgments given after the date of entry into force of
this Convention in proceedings instituted before that date shall be
recognised and enforced in accordance with the provisions of Title
HI if jurisdiction was founded upon rules which accorded with
those provided for either in Title H of this Convention or in a con-
vention concluded between the State of origin and the State ad-
dressed which was in force when the proceedings were instituted.
TITLE VII-RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER
CONVENTIONS
ARTICLE 55
Subject to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article
54, and Article 56, this Convention shall, for the States which are
parties to it, supersede the following conventions concluded be-
tween two or more of them.
-the Convention between Belgium and France on jurisdiction
and the validity and enforcement of judgments, arbitration
awards and authentic instruments, signed at Paris on July 8,
1899,
-the Convention between Belgium and the Netherlands on juris-
diction, bankruptcy, and the validity and enforcement of judg-
ments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments, signed at
Brussels on March 28, 1925,
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-the Convention between France and Italy on the enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Rome on
June 3, 1930,
-the Convention between the United Kingdom and the French
Republic providing for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments
in civil and commercial matters, with Protocol, signed at Paris on
January 18, 1934,
-the Convention between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom
of Belgium, providing .for the reciprocal enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters, with Protocol, signed at
Brussels on May 2, 1934,
-the Convention between Germany and Italy on the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,
signed at Rome on March 9, 1936,
-the Convention between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Kingdom of Belgium on the mutual recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments
in civil and commercial matters, signed at Bonn on June 30, 1958,
-the Convention between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Italian Republic on the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Rome on April
17, 1959,
-the Convention between the United Kingdom and the Federal
Republic of Germany for the reciprocal recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at
Bonn on July 14, 1960,
-the Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Ital-
ian Republic on the recognition and enforcement of judgments
and other enforceable instruments in civil and commercial mat-
ters, signed at Rome on April 6, 1962,
-the Convention between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Federal Republic of Germany on the mutual recognition and
enforcement of judgments and other enforceable instruments in
civil and commercial matters, signed at The Hague on August 30,
1962,
-the Convention between the United Kingdom and the Republic
of Italy for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Rome on Febru-
ary 7, 1964, with amending Protocol signed at Rome on July 14,
1970,
-the Convention between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom
of the Netherlands providing for the reciprocal recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil matters, signed at The Hague
on November 17, 1967,
and, in so far as it is in force:
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-the Treaty between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg
on jurisdiction, bankruptcy, and the validity and enforcement of
judgments, arbitration awards and authentic instruments, signed
at Brussels on November 24, 1961.
ARTICLE 56
The Treaty and the conventions referred to in Article 55 shall
continue to have effect in relation to matters to which this Conven-
tion does not apply.
They shall continue to have effect in respect of judgments
given and documents formally drawn up or registered as authentic
instruments before the entry into force of this Convention.
ARTICLE 57
This Convention shall not affect any conventions to which the
Contracting States are or will be parties and which in relation to
particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or en-
forcement of judgments.
This Convention shall not affect the application of provisions
which, in relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the
recognition or enforcement of judgments and which are or will be
contained in acts of the institutions of the European Communities
or in national laws harmonised in implementation of such acts.
ARTICLE 58
This Convention shall not affect the rights granted to Swiss
nationals by the Convention concluded on June 15, 1869, between
France and the Swiss Confederation on Jurisdiction and the en-
forcement of judgments in civil matters.
ARTICLE 59
This Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from
assuming, in a convention on the recognition and enforcement of
judgments, an obligation towards a third State not to recognise
judgments given in other Contracting States against defendants
domiciled or habitually resident in the third State where, in cases
provided for in Article 4, the judgment could only be founded on a
ground of jurisdiction specified in the second paragraph of Article
3.
However, a Contracting State may not assume an obligation
towards a third State not to recognise a judgment given in another
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Contracting State by a court basing its jurisdiction on the presence
within that State of property belonging to the defendant, or the
seizure by"the plaintiff of property situated there:
1. if the action is brought to assert or declare proprietary or pos-
sessory rights in that property, seeks to obtain authority to dis-
pose of it, or arises from another issue relating to such property,
or,
2. if the property constitutes the security for a debt which is the
subject matter of the action.
ARTICLE 63
The Contracting States recognise that any State which be-
comes a member of the Eruropean Economic Community shall be
required to accept this Convention as a basis for the negotiations
between the Contracting States and that State necessary to ensure
the implementation of the last paragraph of Article 220 of the
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.
The necessary adjustments may be the subject of a special
convention between the Contracting States of the one part and the
new Member States of the other part.
ARTICLE 67
Any Contracting State may request the revision of this Con-
vention. In this event, a revision conference shall be convened by
the President of the Council of the European Communities.
PROTOCOL (ABRIDGED)
The High Contracting Parties have agreed upon the following
provisions, which shall be annexed to the Convention:
ARTICLE I
Any person domiciled in Luxembourg who is sued in a court of
another Contracting State pursuant to Article 5(1) may refuse to
submit to the jurisdiction of that court. If the defendant does not
enter an appearance the court shall declare of its own motion that
it has no jurisdiction.
An agreement conferring jurisdiction, within the meaning of
Article 17, shall be valid with respect to a person domiciled in Lux-





Without prejudice to any more favorable provisions of na-
tional laws, persons domiciled in a Contracting State who are be-
ing prosecuted in the criminal courts of another Contracting State
of which they are not nationals for an offense which was not inten-
tionally committed may be defended by persons qualified to do so,
even if they do not appear in person.
However, the court seised of the matter may order appearance
in person; in the case of failure to appear, a judgment given in the
civil action without the person concerned having had the opportu-
nity to arrange for his defence need not be recognised or enforced
in the other Contracting States.
ARTcLE HI
In proceedings for the issue of an order for enforcement, no
charge, duty or fee calculated by reference to the value of the mat-
ter in issue may be levied in the State in which enforcement is
sought.
ARTcLE IV
Judicial and extrajudicial documents drawn up in one Con-
tracting State which have to be served on persons in another Con-
tracting State shall be transmitted in accordance with the proce-
dures laid down in the conventions and agreements concluded
between the Contracting States.
Unless the State in which service is to take place objects by
declaration to the Secretary-General of the Council of the Euro-
pean Communities, such documents may also be sent by the ap-
propriate public officers of the State in which the document has
been drawn up directly to the appropriate public officers of the
State in which the addressee is to be found. In this case the officer
of the State of origin shall send a copy of the document to the
officer of the State applied to who is competent to forward it to the
addressee. The document shall be forwarded in the manner speci-
fied by the law of the State applied to. The forwarding shall be
recorded by a certificate sent directly to the officer of the State of
origin.
ARTicLE V
The jurisdiction specified in Articles 6 (2) and 10 in actions on
No. 1]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
a warranty or guarantee or in any other third-party proceedings
may not be resorted to in the Federal Republic of Germany. In
that State, any person domiciled in another Contracting State may
be sued in the courts in pursuance of Article 68, 72, 73 and 74 of
the code of civil procedure (Zivilprozessordnung) concerning third-
party notices.
Judgments given in the other Contracting States by virtue of
Article 6 (2) or 10 shall be recognised and enforced in the Federal
Republic of Germany in accordance with Title III. Any effects
which judgments given in that State may have on third parties by
application of Article 68, 72, 73 and 74 of the code of civil proce-
dure (Zivilprozessordnung) shall also be recognised in the other
Contracting States.
ARTICLE VB
In proceedings involving a dispute between the master and a
member of the crew of a sea-going ship registered in Denmark or
in Ireland, concerning remuneration or other conditions of service,
a court in a Contracting State shall establish whether the diplo-
matic or consular officer responsible for the ship has been notified
of the dispute. It shall stay the proceedings so long as he has not
been notified. It shall of its own motion decline jurisdiction if the
officer, having been notified, has exercised the powers accorded to
him in the matter by a consular convention, or in the absence of
such a convention has, within the time allowed, raised any objec-
tion to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
ARTICLE VD
Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the European Patent
Office under the Convention on the grant of European patents,
signed at Munich on October 5, 1973, the courts of each Con-
tracting State shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domi-
cile, in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of
any European patent granted for that State which is not a Com-
munity patent by virtue of the provisions of Article 86 of the Con-
vention for the European patent for the Common Market, signed
at Luxembourg on December 15, 1975.
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